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I. INTRODUCTION
I RAN in the 1970s is a nation adrift amidst three cultures. The
first and oldest of these is Persian, stretching back over two
thousand years to the Achaemenian dynasty of Cyrus and Darius the
Great.1 The second is Islamic, having its roots in the Arab conquest of
Persia in the seventh century A.D. 2 The third and most recent of the
three is Western, a culture which has been a significant force in Iran
for over a century and which has grown stronger and more pro-
nounced with the increased oil revenues of the past few years.
The mix of these three cultures is a fact of daily life for the average
Iranian. A businessman in Teheran or Shiraz cannot help being
reminded of it when he glances at his desk calendar: the date is given
in the Western, Iranian and Arabic systems of dating. Depending on
the perspective of the moment, the year can be 1976, 1355 or 1396. 3
But Iran has failed to adapt easily to this cultural disparity-a failure
which is the root cause of one of the country's most intractable and
chronic social ills--drug abuse. 4 Each of the three cultural elements
has contributed to the growth of the problem, thereby making drug
abuse in Iran extremely difficult to understand, let alone control. 5
The Arabic influence introduced narcotic drugs into what is now
Iran. Bent on spreading Islam, Arab warriors used opium to ward off
hunger and fatigue during their military campaigns.
1. The Achaemenian dynasty began with Cyrus the Great in the 6th century B.C. and ended
with the death of Darius III Codomannus in 330 B.C. after the Persian Empire had been
conquered by Alexander of Macedon. For a brief history of the period see R. Ghirshman, Iran
127-219 (1961).
2. The final battle between Arabia and Persia took place at Nahavand in 642 A.D., after
which the Arabs controlled what was left of the Sassanian Persian Empire. P. Sykes, Persia 41-43
(1922).
3. Both the Iranian and Arabic systems of dating begin with the year 622-the year of
Mohammed's hegira from Mecca to Medina. However, the Arabic calendar is based on lunar
years which usually contain 354 days, whereas the Iranian calendar is based on solar years which
usually contain 365 days. Thus the Iranian year is now 1355, while the Arabic year is now 1396.
See 3 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Macropaedia 600 (1974). Iran adopted the solar calendar In 1925
during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. For a full discussion of these calendar technicalities see L.
Dupree, Afghanistan 674-75 (1973).
4. In this Article, the term "drug abuse" is used to mean the self-administration of a drug
without the supervision of a doctor.
5. For earlier English language studies on drg abuse in Iran see E. MacCallum, Twenty
Years of Persian Opium (1908-1928) (1928); Mowlana, The Politics of Opium In Iran: A
Sodal-Psychological Interface, in Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy 159 (L. Simmons & A. Said eds.
1974); A. Neligan, The Opium Question with Special Reference to Persia (1927); F. Johns,
History of Drug Abuse in Iran, June 1972 (unpublished thesis in University of Utah Library);
McLaughlin & Quinn, Drug Control in Iran: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 59 Iowa L. Rev.
469 (1974).
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"Nomadic people, living in a torrid climate, having to cross vast deserts, exposed to
the suffering of hunger, perceived that the sap of the plant constituted a tonic agent
capable of renewing their strength. Therefore they utilized it and little by little the
habit was induced. When their mount was exhausted they shared the sap with it and
continued on their way." 6
The Arabs saw no religious contradiction in using opium. The Koran
expressly forbids the use of alcohol, 7 but the prohibition against opium
use is far from dear, if in fact it exists at all.8
Once opium was introduced into Persia, the Iranian temperament
found its use most congenial. Iranians, then as today, tended to
consider themselves philosophical and sensitive. Opium released one
from care and gratified a desire for physical relaxation and emotional
introspection. "The smoker of opium, tending towards skepticism or
philosophical speculation, mixed his pastime usually with a quotation
from Sadi or Firdowsi, or Omar Khayyam." 9 For the less affluent
Iranian, opium was a welcomed respite from the drudgery and toil of
peasant life. For rich and poor alike, it could be used as a medicine for
pain and disease.
Western influence aggravated the existing opium problem and, in
addition, introduced new forms of drug abuse into the country. It is a
common belief in Iran that during the nineteenth century foreign
powers-particularly England-disseminated opium throughout the
country to further their political ambitions. 10 Whether or not this
supposition is true, it would appear that the recent increase in psycho-
tropic drug abuse in Iran does stem from exposure to Western
influences. With thousands of Westerners living and working in Iran
and thousands of Iranian students living abroad," it is not surprising
6. M. Shahkar, Summary on the Question of Opium in Iran 8 (Int'l Soc'y for Criminology,
Teheran Univ., 24th Intl Course of Criminology, 4th Symposium of C.LC.C., Teheran, May
15-22, 1974), quoting Martin, Opium and Its Abuses 13 (1893).
7. Koran H216; IV:46; V:92 (A. Arberry transl. 1967); The Meaning of the Glorious Koran
1:219; IV:43; V:91 (M. Pickthall transl. 1961). These passages in the Koran use the Arabic word
"khamr" which has been variously translated as "intoxicant" or "strong drink." See Dixon,
Narcotics Legislation and Islam in Egypt, 24 Bull. Narc., Oct.-Dec. 1972, at 11, 13. One early
Muslim jurist, in a tour de force of scholastic reasoning, argued that it was "not permissible to
ride a camel which had drunk wine because of possible contact with the forbidden substance
through the sweat of the camel." N. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 82 (1964).
8. See Dixon, supra note 7, at 12. But an argument can be made that the Koran does prohibit
drug use by prohibiting the use of intoxicants. Id. at 13. Interestingly, the Koran does not specify
a punishment for drinking alcohol. See Maydani, 'Uqiibt: Penal Law, in 1 Law in the Middle
East 232 (ML Khadduri & H. Liebesny eds. 1955).
9. Mowlana, supra note 5, at 166.
10. See note 217 infra and accompanying text.
11. There were 9,623 Iranian students in the United States during the 1973-1974 academic
year. Institute of International Education, Open Doors 1974, Report on International Educa-
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that barbiturates and LSD, the abuse of which originated in Western
culture, have begun to appear in Iran, adding a new component to the
already existing drug problem.
Due to its geographical and economic position, the patterns of drug
use in Iran are of more than passing interest to the world community
in general and to the United States in particular. An earlier study by
this author traced the historical growth of drug addiction in Iran; 12 this
second Article, however, will analyze the drug problems presently
existing in Iran. Recent developments make such a study particularly
timely. First, Turkey's decision in 1974 to end its opium ban may lead
to increased narcotics smuggling on Iran's western border. As a
consequence, Iran should be an important barometer for judging
whether Turkey can maintain adequate controls over its opium pro-
duction. Second, in the past few years Iran has become a critical
transshipment country for drugs moving from Asia to Europe and
ultimately to the United States. 13 Hashish grown in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Nepal moves through Iran to Germany and beyond.
Assuming Turkey's opium controls are effective, Pakistani and Afghan
opium also could begin to pass through Iran, thereby providing a new
source of supply for European heroin traffickers. Third, Iran is rapidly
moving from the status of a developing nation to that of a developed
nation. How Iran copes with its traditional opium problem in the
context of this rapid industrial change will be watched carefully by
other developing nations. For example, the success or failure of Iran's
massive opium maintenance program-perhaps the largest drug main-
tenance program in the world-will have a strong impact on other
developing nations considering such a strategy. Fourth, Iran will be
watched to see how new Western patterns of drug abuse can be
handled by a nation changing from a traditional Moslem society to a
cosmopolitan, industrialized society. Arnold Toynbee has argued that
a relatively mild virus of one culture often becomes a cancer in a
second culture when the second culture does not have countervailing
cultural antibodies to contain the spread of the virus; 14 heroin and
barbiturate abuse-predominantly Western viruses's-may become
tional Exchange 2, 26 (1975). This figure represented an increase of approximately 2,000 from the
1972-1973 academic year. Id. at 2. In 1974, only Hong Kong and India had more students than
Iran studying in the United States. Id. See generally Fiske, Arab and Iranian Students Increasing
at U.S. Colleges, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1975, at 1, cols. 3-4.
12. McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 5.
13. Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1975, at 45, cols. 1-2.
14. A. Toynbee, The World and the West 70 (1953).
15. Heroin abuse, of course, also exists in the Orient in such places as Hong Kong and
Thailand. See, e.g., A. Hess, Chasing the Dragon, A Report on Drug Addiction in Hong Kong
(1965).
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even more serious problems in Iran than in the United States or
Europe.
This Article is written in the belief that other countries with drug
problems, especially the United States, can benefit from Iran's experi-
ence. With this end in mind, Part II of the Article will describe briefly
drug patterns in the nations bordering Iran in order to locate Iran in
the overall narcotics picture in the Near East. Part III will consider the
causes of drug addiction in Iran, and Part IV will describe the
government's response to the problem, with special emphasis on the
drug maintenance, rehabilitation, law enforcement and research efforts
underway in the country. Part V, the concluding section of the Article,
will evaluate the effectiveness of these drug control policies in contain-
ing drug abuse.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE NEAR EAST
The geopolitical significance of Iran results from its position as a
natural land bridge between the Far East and Europe. Unless routed
through Russia, anything transported by land east from Europe or
west from Asia must pass through the country.' 6 Hence, by virtue of
its location, Iran necessarily is affected by the illicit patterns of drug
traffic and the levels of addiction in neighboring countries. Thus,
before studying the narcotics situation in Iran, it would be instructive
to survey generally the drug abuse problems of Iraq, Turkey, the
Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all of which share a common
border with Iran.
A. Iraq
Until recently, relations between Iraq and Iran were strained. The
Shah of Iran openly supported a Kurdish insurgency in Iraq by
supplying the Kurds with weapons and money. 17 In March of 1975,
the two countries reached an accord whereby Iraq made certain border
concessions on the Persian Gulf in return for Iran's withdrawal of
support for the Kurdish insurgents.' 8 The border between the two
16. The ancient silk route from China to Europe ran through Persia. Moving from east to
west, the road passed through Meshed in eastern Iran and across the country to present-day
Turkey. For a fuller description of the Persian segment of this famous highway see R. Bulliet,
The Patricians of Nishapur 5 (1972). At the time of Marco Polo's travels (c. 1270-1290 A.D.), the
road had already been in existence for 1,400 years. 15 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Macropaedia 894
(1974).
17. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1975, at 1, cols. 6-7. The Kurds desired to form "an autonomous
Kurdistan within a democratic Iraq." Woodson, "Ve Who Face Death," 147 Natl Geographic
364, 386 (1975).
18. N.Y. Times, Mfar. 7, 1975, at 1, cols. 6-7. After the accord was reached, however, Iran
offered sanctuary to Kurdish rebels fleeing the subsequent Iraqi military offensive. Id., Mar. IS,
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countries has remained tense, however, and is still heavily patrolled.
Perhaps as a consequence, there has been little evidence of significant
drug smuggling over this frontier. 19
Although there is little data available on illicit drug use in Iraq, the
information that is available suggests that drug abuse is not a sig-
nificant problem. It is illegal to cultivate cannabis, khat, the opium
poppy or the coca bush, 20 and the Iraqi government has not reported
uncovering any illicit cultivation of these plants in 1973.21 Since Iraq
does not have a program for dispensing opium to registered addicts,
any person who uses drugs obtains his supply from the illicit market,
which, from reported seizures of illicit drugs, appears to be quite
small. The total amount of drugs seized in 1973 was only eighteen
grams of opium and approximately nine kilograms of cannabis. 22
Either drug enforcement in Iraq is lax, which is unlikely in a socialist
country, or the small quantity of drugs seized indicates that drug abuse
is not widespread. There are of course occasional instances of illegal
opium or cannabis abuse in Iraq, the opium and cannabis being
smuggled into the country from either Lebanon, Turkey, Iran or
Pakistan. 23 In 1973, for example, a Pakistani was caught with almost
seven kilograms of cannabis which he was attempting to smuggle into
Iraq by air. 2A
To bolster anti-smuggling efforts, Iraq ratified the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs25 and adopted a rather comprehensive domes-
1975, at 7, col. 3. There are approximately 1,400,000 Kurds living in Iran, and the government of
Iran itself has been plagued in the past by Kurdish aspirations to form a separate Kurdish state.
In 1946, the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was formed in Iran, but it collapsed before the end of
the year. On the entire question of Iran and Kurdistan see D. Kinanne, The Kurds and Kurdistan
46-58 (1970).
19. This information was obtained from officials in Teheran. During June and July 1975, the
author visited Teheran, Shiraz and Kermanshah in Iran and had extended discussions with
Iranian, United Nations and American officials who were stationed there and were knowledge-
able in the drug field. In addition, the author discussed the Iranian drug situation with American
officials in Washington and with United Nations officials in Geneva, Switzerland. Finally, the
author visited Afghanistan and Turkey to obtain an additional perspective on drug abuse In the
entire Near East region. Much of the information presented in this Article is based on these
discussions and the author's own field observations. Citations to this material will be indicated by
the words "Field Study."
20. Law No. 68 of 1965, Concerning Narcotic Drugs, art. 2, § 1 (Iraq), U.N. Doc.
E/NL. 1969/48 (1970).
21. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit
Traffic, Iraq § 42(b), U.N. Doc. EIIT/1973/9 (1974).
22. Id. § 43.
23. Id. § 42(a).
24. Id. § 48.
25. Law No. 16 of 1962 (Iraq). For a list of those nations which are parties to this convention
see Treaties Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 380-81
(1975).
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tic drug law. Possession of controlled substances, which include
opium, heroin, cocaine and cannabis, is illegal unless the possessor is
licensed to handle these drugs or has obtained them by prescription.2 6
Although penalties for violating the law vary depending on the gravity
of the offense, simple possession of contraband drugs can merit a jail
sentence of six months to five years,2 7 and the death sentence can be
imposed on traffickers.28 Interestingly, any participation in a conspir-
acy to violate the drug laws, and any illegal financial dealing in violation
of these laws are themselves separate offenses in Iraq. 29
B. Turkey
Turkey has been much discussed in terms of narcotic law enforce-
ment. Turkish opium, with its high morphine content, has been the
source of eighty percent of the illicit heroin sold in the United States
and Western Europe. 30 The so-called "heroin trail" from Anatolia to
Istanbul to Marseilles to New York has been the subject of extensive
study. 31 Although it is not the purpose of this Article to restate what
has already been said, some mention should be made of recent
developments in Turkey which are likely to have an impact on Iran
and the United States.
Although Turkey has been under pressure for decades to ban poppy
cultivation, 32 little success was achieved until 1972. Basically, Turkey
views the opium poppy as a valuable cash crop with multiple collateral
benefits for the farmer. 33 Since the country has a small addict popula-
26. Law No. 68 of 1965, Concerning Narcotic Drugs, art. 8, § 1 (Iraq), U.N. Doc.
E/NL 1969/48 (1970). For the applicable rules pertaining to medical prescriptions see Notice No.
19 of 30 June 1968 (Iraq), U.N. Doc. EINL.1970113 (1971).
27. Law No. 68 of 1965, Concerning Narcotic Drugs, art. 14, § 2 (Iraq), U.N. Doc.
E/NL. 1969/48 (1970).
28. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit
Traffic, Iraq § 46, U.N. Doc. E/IT/1973/9 (1974).
29. Law No. 68 of 1965, Concerning Narcotic Drugs, art. 14, § 3 (Iraq), U.N. Doc.
E/NL. 1969148 (1970).
30. Statement of Congressman Lester L. Wolff, Hearings on Turkish Opium Ban Negotia-
tions Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974) (hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. The morphine content of Turkish opium generally varies from ten to sixteen
percent. Staff and Editors of Newsday, The Heroin Trail 7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The
Heroin Trail]. Some Turkish opium from the Torkat-Amasya area in north-central Turkey,
however, reportedly contains a morphine content of twenty-two percent. Field Study, supra note
19. For reference to high-grade morphine base being produced in the Amasya region see N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1972, at 14, col. 2.
31. See, e.g., A. Moscow, The Merchants of Heroin (1968); C. Siragusa, The Trail of the
Poppy (1966); The Heroin Trail, supra note 30.
32. For an early effort to pressure Turkey into ending poppy cultivation see Act of Mar. 2,
1923, ch. 190, § 3, 42 Stat. 1433.
33. For a description of the many collateral uses of opium see The Opium Poppy, 5 Bull.
Narc., July-Sept. 1953, at 9; N.Y. Times, May 11, 1974, at 9, cols. 3, 6-7.
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tion, 34 it has been of little concern to the Turkish government that
Americans abuse heroin in a way that the Turks do not. But in 1971,
bowing to political pressure and economic blandishments, Turkey
agreed to ban poppy cultivation at the end of the 1972 summer
harvest. 35 In return, the United States promised 35.7 million dollars in
financial aid to be spent over a five year period to help the poppy
farmer substitute alternative crops for opium. 3 6 Then, in 1974, Turkey
reversed its policy by lifting the ban and returning to opium cultiva-
tion. 37
There are a number of reasons why Turkey decided to reinstate
poppy cultivation. First, some in the Turkish government felt that the
35.7 million dollars promised by the United States was inadequate. 38
In addition, the crop compensation formula whereby the money was to
be distributed was heavily criticized. For example, crop substitution
payments were to be made to farmers on the basis of the amount of
opium they had sold to the government in 1971. 39 But due to crop
34. Akcasu, A Study of Reasons for the Lack of Opium Use Among Opium Growers, in The
1974 CENTO Seminar on the Epidemiology of Non-Medical Drug Use 156 [hereinafter cited as
CENTO Seminar]. See also The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 7; Hearings, supra note 30, at
20.
35. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
36. Hearings, supra note 30, at 8. For political reasons, the "agreement" made it appear as if
the government of Turkey had made a unilateral decision to stop growing opium and the United
States had made a unilateral decision to provide the 35.7 million dollars in aid. Id. at 54; N.Y.
Times, July 11, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
The "agreement," however, did not cover concealed opium stockpiles. Although this opium
could not be turned in for compensation, the farmer could still sell it illegally to traffickers. That
there were in fact sizeable hidden opium stockpiles when the ban went into effect was evidenced
by one seizure of stored opium totalling almost one ton. Hearings, supra note 30, at 66-67. At one
point, American officials were seriously debating whether to purchase these hidden opium caches.
The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 8. The argument was that if these hidden caches were not
purchased they would long continue to supply the illicit market. This fear was buttressed by the
fact that opium is not affected by long periods of storage. Id. In this respect opium differs from
other drugs whose potency deteriorates rapidly, particularly if they are mixed with adulterants.
See, e.g., R. Woodley, Dealer: Portrait of a Cocaine Merchant 40-41 (1971).
37. The ban was officially lifted on July 1, 1974. Governmental Decree No. 7/8522 of July 1,
1974, Decree to Authorize Opium Poppy Cultivation in the Seven Provinces During 1974-1975
(Turkey), U.N. Doc. EINL.1974/46 (1974); see N.Y. Times, July 2, 1974, at 4, col. 4. Article 1 of
the decree permits opium cultivation throughout the six provinces of Afyon, Burdur, Denizll,
Isparta, Kutahya, and Usak and in all four districts of Konya province.
38. The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 3.
39. Hearings, supra note 30, at 67. If in that year he sold some of his crop illegally, obviously
that amount would not be included in the compensation scheme. In 1970, legal poppy growth In
nine provinces yielded sixty metric tons of opium. But in 1971, the year used to determine the
amount of the subsidy each farmer would be paid, the legal crop equalled 149 tons even though
cultivation was limited to only seven, as opposed to nine, provinces. The Heroin Trail, supra
note 30, at 15-16.
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rotation, some farmers had not grown poppies in 1971.40 As a result,
these farmers received nothing. Other users of the poppy, such as
poppy oil seed crushers, felt the financial impact of the ban but were
similarly excluded from the compensation scheme. 41
Second, the price of a kilo of opium had risen to approximately
thirty-five dollars on the illicit market and was expected to surpass the
forty-one dollars a kilo the United States paid the farmers not to grow
opium.42 Politically, it would be difficult for the Turkish authorities to
prohibit farmers from engaging in financially lucrative transactions.
Third, since American aid was to be paid out over a five year
period, it was critical that an adequate income-substitution program be
established within that time. Crop substitution programs, however,
were lagging, and innovative ideas, such as a commodity futures
market, were still only in the planning stage. 43
The fourth and perhaps most important reason for lifting the ban
was politics. The ban was a major campaign issue in the Turkish
election of October 1973, being viewed by many as an example of
American political interference in Turkish affairs." Few politicians
could afford to support it. Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the victorious
Republican People's Party, had pledged during his election campaign
to end the ban. In March 1974, Washington received official notifica-
tion of his decision.45
Other considerations also influenced the decision to lift the ban.
Western pharmaceutical companies, reacting to a world shortage of
codeine, had consistently opposed the ban, a fact that undoubtedly
convinced Turkey that opium could be sold at a premium price and
that production therefore should not be terminated. 46 Additionally,
newspaper articles quoted American officials as saying that the United
States itself might consider growing opium because of the codeine
shortage. 47 It was difficult for Turkey to reconcile these reports with
the American-induced ban on poppy cultivation in Turkey. Finally,
40. Since the poppy depletes the soil, it is usually rotated with other crops such as wheat,
barley and melons. Hearings, supra note 30, at 50.
41. Id. at 62. These oil pressers were numerous. There were an estimated 300 in Afyon
province alone. N.Y. Times, lay 11, 1974, at 9, col. 3.
42. Hearings, supra note 30, at 67.
43. Id. See also The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 16-17. But for a description of one
innovative program trying to increase the wheat yields in Anatolia see N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1975, at 4, col. 4.
44. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1974, at 8, col. 3; cf. The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 18.
45. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1974, at 8, col. 4.
46. Field Study, supra note 19; Hearings, supra note 30, at 68.
47. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1974, at 26, col. 1; Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1974, at Ell,
col. 5.
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Turkey was vexed that India was being encouraged to increase opium
production to fill the void left by the Turkish ban. 48
As expected, American reaction to the lifting of the ban was strongly
negative. The State Department and the Pentagon had to discourage
Congress from cutting off all aid to Turkey absent a restoration of the
ban.49 In September 1974, however, through United Nations efforts, a
compromise was worked out whereby the Turks agreed to harvest the
poppy crop by the so-called poppy straw method.50 This method, in
contrast to the lancing method whereby morphine is produced solely
from the latex of the pod,51 entails harvesting the entire poppy plant
after the pod of the plant has dried; then this poppy straw is processed
into morphine. There are a number of advantages to the poppy straw
method. First, since the poppy is not lanced, there is little opportunity
for the opium latex to be diverted into illicit channels. Second, law
enforcement officials can police the poppy fields more easily because
farmers have no reason to go into the fields until the actual day of
harvesting. Third, the process reduces labor costs because fewer
people are required to weed and tend the poppy after planting, and
fewer people are required to harvest the crop. Under the old method of
lancing the poppy, constant weeding was necessary to enable the
farmer to pass easily through the poppy plants when harvesting the
latex. Finally, because of the bulkiness of the poppy straw and the
complexity of the morphine transformation process, there would be
little chance of the straw itself being diverted from government chan-
nels.
48. Hearings, supra note 30, at 61. Before the ban, Turkey supplied the legal pharmaceutical
market with over 100 metric tons of opium. See The Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control, World Opium Survey 1972, in 3 National Commission on Marihuana and
Drug Abuse, Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective 408, 410-12 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as World Opium Survey].
49. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 11, col. 2. As it was, the House of Representatives voted to
ban all credit to Turkey by the Export-Import Bank until the President reported to Congress that
Turkey was cooperating with the United States in heroin control. Cooperation obviously meant a
renewal of the ban. Id., Aug. 22, 1974, at 3, col. 1. See also id., Sept. 14, 1974, at 24, col. 2; id.,
Aug. 6, 1974, at 36, col. 2; id., Aug. 1, 1974, at3, col. 5; id., July 12, 1974, at 5, col. 1. Congress
ultimately did ban all military aid to Turkey because of Turkey's use of American military
weapons in the invasion of Cyprus.
SO. A U.N. mission was in Turkey from August 26 to September 10, 1974 to consider the
most effective means of controlling the new poppy cultivation. On September 13, 1974, with
U.N. encouragement, the government of Turkey agreed in principle to use the poppy straw
method of harvesting. The decree actually outlawing poppy lancing was not promulgated,
however, until December 6, 1974. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission
on Narcotic Drugs, Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, Supp. 5, 1 276, at 61, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.7/577 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session].
51. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1974, at 9, col. 1. For a general description of the poppy straw
process see The Manufacture of Morphine from Poppy Straw, 5 Bull. Narc., July-Sept. 1953, at
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The success or failure of the poppy straw experiment in Turkey will
in the last analysis depend on two factors-money and policing. The
farmer must obtain an adequate price for his crop to discourage him
from secretly lancing the poppy and selling the latex illegally. A farmer
can receive about thirty-five dollars per kilo of opium latex from an
illicit trafficker. It is estimated that the Turkish farmer will receive
between eighteen and twenty-one Turkish lira for each kilo of poppy
straw harvested,5 2 roughly one and a half dollars per kilo. Since the
entire plant-stalks and all-is weighed under the poppy straw
method, the greater weight of the straw over the latex should result in
the farmer receiving approximately the same financial return from the
government as from the illicit trafficker. Also, the farmer's labor costs
should be reduced under the poppy straw method. Harvest of opium
under the lancing method is labor intensive, requiring more skilled
workers than does the poppy straw method. Finally, of course, by not
dealing in the illicit market, the farmer avoids the possibility of arrest.
In addition to ensuring that the farmer receives a price competitive
with that offered by the illicit trafficker, the Turkish government must
adequately enforce its new poppy straw regulations. Two separate law
enforcement problems require attention. First, the government must
detect and destroy unlicensed cultivation. Sufficient manpower,
sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, an efficient network of informers are needed to accomplish
this objective. Second, the government must enforce the harvesting of
the poppy crop by the poppy straw method. To prevent lancing, it will
be necessary to keep farmers out of the fields for about fifteen days
before the actual day of the harvest,5 3 since it is during this two week
period that a farmer could profitably extract the latex.
The primary responsibility for these law enforcement efforts falls on
the Turkish National Police and the Turkish Gendarmerie. S4 Although
the lines of jurisdiction between the two forces are not always precise,
the gendarmes tend to be more visible in small towns and rural areas;
consequently, they will have the major burden of enforcing the poppy
straw regulations in the provinces. Gendarmerie and Turkish
National Police narcotic teams now work in approximately half of the
country's sixty-seven provinces.55 Although these units may not always
be adequately staffed,5 6 the Turks do possess aerial reconnaissance
52. Field Study, supra note 19.
53. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1974, at 9, col. 1.
54. Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, supra note 50, at 61.
55. Id.
56. For example in Istanbul, with a population of over 2,200,000 people, there are only sixty
narcotics police, not all of whom could be considered trained narcotics officers. Field Study, supra
note 19. Throughout the entire country, there is a combined police and gendarme narcotics
control force of 728. Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, supra note SO, at 61.
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capabilities which supplement the ground observation units. S7 Al-
though aerial detection of poppy growth is a relatively new science,
many experts agree that it is effective.
It will take several months at the least to determine whether the
poppy straw process has been successful in keeping Turkish opium off
the illicit market. If the experiment is a failure, it will not be for lack
of international effort. As in other countries in the Near East, Turkish
police and gendarmes have been trained in narcotics techniques in the
United States, and an American mobile training team has instructed
additional drug enforcement personnel in Turkey."8 Trucks and patrol
jeeps have also been provided to implement the policing effort. s9
When asked whether the poppy straw process will be effective,
Iranian officials publicly have adopted a wait and see attitude, al-
though privately they are cynical. Two years ago some of these same
officials prophesied that the ban would not last, and they have been
proven correct. 60 If Turkish opium is diverted into illegal channels,
Iran, like the United States, will be a primary victim country of the
end product of the illegal diversion-heroin.
C. U.S.S.R.
Like Iraq, the Soviet Union seems to have a minimal drug problem.
Poppy cultivation is permitted only in certain areas of the country and
then only under stringent government regulation. Most of the domestic
opium poppy cultivation is centered in the Issyk Kul mountain valley
in the Republic of Kirghiz. 61 Once harvested, this opium is first
converted into morphine and other necessary alkaloids at a govern-
ment operated factory and is then distributed under tight security to
facilities such as hospitals and research institutions requiring a supply
of these drugs. 62 Since the processing and distribution of narcotic
drugs is a state monopoly, all requests for these substances must be
submitted in writing to the Standing Committee on Drugs in the
Ministry of Health. 63 Prescriptions for narcotic drugs can be written
57. Field Study, supra note 19. Aerial poppy sensing, which can be achieved from either
planes or satellites, is accomplished by sophisticated infrared photography.
58. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, First
Report of the Sub-Commission on Illicit Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East
1973-1974, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/566 (1974) [hereinafter cited as First Report of the
Sub-Commission].
59. Field Study, supra note 19.
60. Id.
61. Shuljgin, Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and the Oil Poppy in the Soviet Union, 21
Bull. Narc., Oct.-Dec. 1969, at 1.
62. Borisov, Are Drug Addicts a Problem in the U.S.S.R.?, Soviet Life, June 1975, at 54
[hereinafter cited as Treatment of Drug Addicts in the Soviet Union].
63. Id.
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only by doctors employed in state hospitals and then only on special
forms.6 4 Perhaps as a result of these controls, the Soviet government
was able to report to the United Nations in 1973 that there were 3,100
known addicts in the country-a miniscule number when compared to
the overall population of approximately 250,000,000.65
Most of these known addicts are so-called "medical addicts," their
addiction having originated from medical treatment of some illness.
The majority have been addicted for over five years-mostly to opium,
morphine or codeine. 66 The emphasis in the Soviet Union is on
voluntary treatment for addicts. Treatment usually proceeds in three
stages.67  The first and second stages-withdrawal followed by
psychological and physical rehabilitation-take place on an in-patient
basis over a period of a few months. The third stage-occupational
therapy and continued psychological support-takes place after the
addict has left the hospital and returned to the community. Relatives
and employers of the addict participate in these out-patient programs.
The Soviet government, however, does not sanction drug maintenance
as an acceptable form of treatment. 68
For the stubborn addict who will not voluntarily undergo rehabilita-
tion, compulsory treatment is imposed. By court order, addicts can be
sent to a treatment center for periods lasting six months to two years. 69
Addicts who are convicted of crime can also be forced into rehabilita-
tion in lieu of prison. But one study of the dispositions of criminal
cases in the Kirghiz Republic showed that few convicted addicts were
in fact forced into treatment; most were sent to jail.70 Unfortunately
for the addicts, compulsory treatment in the Soviet Union generally
means the loss of employment. 71
Despite tight controls, an illicit drug market does exist in the Soviet
Union. How large or widespread that market may be is not known,
but some scattered information is available. Hashish smoking is report-
edly not uncommon, particularly in the southern and Asian regions of
64. Id.
65. For the number of addicts in the Soviet Union see Deputy Minister of Health-U.S.S.R.
Report on the Traffic in Opium and Other Narcotic Drugs in the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics 1973, at 2 (on file at Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Report-
U.S.S.R].The census figures for the Soviet Union showed a population of 241,700,000 in January
1970. The 250,000,000 figure is an estimate of the present population based on that 1970 census.
66. Id. at 2-3; Treatment of Drug Addicts in the Soviet Union, supra note 62, at 55.
67. Treatment of Drug Addicts in the Soviet Union, supra note 62, at 56.
68. Id.
69. Decree No. 275 of Apr. 25, 1974, On Intensifying the Struggle with Drug Addiction, § 11,
[1974] 18 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 5928 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
70. Koryagin, Court Practice in Applying Measures of a Medical Nature to Alcoholics and
Drug Addicts, Socialist Legality No. 11 (1973) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
71. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
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the country where the hemp plant has been cultivated for centuries.
Students in Tbilisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia, have told visitors
that they smoked hashish, 72 and western travellers in the area have
been offered marijuana. 73 Even the government officially admits that
some cannabis smuggling does take place. 74 As for the abuse of
opiates, there are reported thefts of narcotic drugs from medical
facilities, and the forging of prescriptions is not unknown. 7 5 The extent
of this narcotic drug diversion is, of course, a matter of speculation. In
1973, the government did report that there were no cases of heroin
abuse detected in the country.76 A few years before, however, an
illegal heroin laboratory was uncovered in the resort town of
Pytigorsk.v7 As for illicit trade in psychotropic drugs, there seems to be
some barbiturate abuse, although amphetamine abuse does not appear
to be significant.78 In 1973, the government of the Soviet Union denied
the existence of LSD abuse in the country,79 although in 1972, the
Western press reported that a group of Russian scientists had been
arrested for illegally manufacturing and distributing the drug.80
There are definite indications, however, that regardless of the pres-
ent magnitude of the Soviet drug problem, the government is con-
cerned about the future. On April 25, 1974, the Presidium of the
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet promulgated a decree dealing with drug
abuse" '-apparently the first nationwide drug law in the Soviet Union.
Prior to 1974, drug abuse was regulated by each of the nation's fifteen
republics. The new law provides jail penalties of up to ten years for
the illegal manufacture and sale of narcotic drugs.82 If there are
aggravating circumstances-such as a conspiracy to sell or
manufacture-the penalty is increased to a minimum of six and a
maximum of fifteen years,8 3 while the illicit cultivation of the poppy or
the hemp plant is punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to five
72. Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1972, at 18, col. 2.
73. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1972, at 7, col. 1.
74. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit
Traffic, U.S.S.R. 2, U.N. Doc. E/IT/1973/69 (1974).
75. Id.; Treatment of Drug Addicts in the Soviet Union, supra note 62, at 56.
76. Report-U.S.S.R., supra note 65, at 2.
77. Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1972, at 18, col. 2.
78. Treatment of Drug Addicts in the Soviet Union, supra note 62, at 55.
79. Report-U.S.S.R., supra note 65, at 2.
80. Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1972, at 18, col. 1.
81. Decree No. 275 of Apr. 25, 1974, On Intensifying the Struggle with Drug Addiction,
[1974] 18 Ved. Verkh. Soy. S.S.S.R. Item 5928 (Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R.).
82. Id. § 1.
83. Id.
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years. 84 Under the law, simple possession of a narcotic drug may merit
a three year jail sentence.85
Perhaps as a result of tight border controls, there are no reported
cases of smuggling over the Iranian-Russian frontier. Along the border
between the two countries is a no-man's land with Russian ob-
servation towers positioned every three to five kilometers, depending
on the terrain. 86 Although Turkmen nomads live on both sides of the
Iranian-Russian border to the east of the Caspian Sea, there have been
no serious allegations that these nomadic tribes smuggle drugs over the
border.87 Fishermen on the Caspian Sea could conceivably arrange to
smuggle drugs into either country, but there is no evidence to support
such speculation. There are rumors, however, that some drug smug-
gling from Afghanistan to Russia may take place. Afghan hashish may
occasionally move through Russia to the West either in sealed air
freight containers or in TIR trucks.8 8 On the one hand, Soviet customs
may not always thoroughly search goods that are merely in transit
through the country, while on the other hand, Western customs may
be less careful in inspecting goods exiting from Russia because of an
erroneous belief in the thoroughness of Soviet customs.
D. Afghanistan
In terms of Iran's domestic drug problem, Afghanistan, perhaps
more than Turkey, is the most critical country in the region. Smug-
gling on the Iranian-Afghan frontier is a way of life, and as a
consequence, much illicit opium and hashish enters Iran from Afghan
suppliers. In the past two years, however, there are signs that the
government of Afghanistan8 9 has made a renewed commitment to
stop this drug traffic, first by strengthening its law enforcement ef-
forts, and second by taking some preliminary steps to curtail domes-
tic addiction. In 1974, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control and the government of Afghanistan signed an agreement
under which the UN Fund has spent $192,000 to strengthen law
enforcement agencies. 90 The agreement has been extended, and an
84. Id. § 3.
85.. Id. § 6.
86. Field Study, supra note 19; see L. Dupree, Afghanistan 512 (1973).
87. Field Study, supra note 19. For a brief description of the life and customs of the Turkmen
see Irons, The Turkmen Nomads, 77 Natural Hist., Nov. 1968, at 44.
88. Field Study, supra note 19. For a discussion of TIR trucks and smuggling see notes
375-85 infra and accompanying text.
89. On July 17, 1973, a coup dcetat in Afghanistan replaced the existing monarchy with a new
republican regime. L. Dupree, Afghanistan 753 (1973); Kabul Times, June 26, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
90. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 10.
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additional $700,000 has been budgeted for these purposes. 91 In addi-
tion, the government of Afghanistan has contributed some of its own
funds to the effort. 92 With these revenues, a United Nations police
advisor in Kabul has begun to train and outfit an Anti-Smuggling Unit
(ASU) in the Criminal Investigating Division of the National Police. 93
The first unit has been set up in Kabul and additional provincial units
are planned. Although the number of trained ASU officers is still
minimal, there are cautious plans for increasing the number to 120.
94
The problems of organizing an effective narcotics bureau are enor-
mous. Perhaps the most critical problem is the lack of equipment. 95
There are, for instance, shortages of clothing, motor vehicles, radios
and weapons. 96 The ASU is only now planning the purchase of its first
airplane, which would facilitate communications with distant areas of
the country and perhaps permit some limited aerial observation. 97 The
gendarmes, who are responsible for patrolling Afghanistan's borders,
have similar logistical problems. On the Iranian frontier, there are
approximately eighty border outposts (although at least 130 are
needed). Most of these, however, have no water or electricity and are
little more than holes in the ground where a gendarme can sleep. 98 In
addition, communications and transport equipment is in short supply.
But, even the purchase of the necessary equipment would not totally
solve the problem. The police and gendarmes must be trained to use
and keep the equipment in proper repair. There have been reports, for
example, of equipment which was never uncrated simply because no
one really knew what to do with it.99
Despite these logistical and training problems, there are some initial
signs that the increased Afghan law enforcement effort is producing
positive results. Opium seizures totaled 487 kilograms in 1972 but
jumped to 10,887 kilograms for the fifteen months from January. 1973
to March 1974.100
91. Field Study, supra note 19.
92. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 10.
93. Field Study, supra note 19.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at Annex II. In 1975, however,
Afghanistan sold approximately sixteen tons of this seized opium to a western pharmaceutical
company at a price of $10.15 per unit of morphine. A unit of morphine is defined as one percent
of morphine in each kilo of opium. Thus if a kilo of opium contained ten percent morphine, there
would be ten units of morphine in the kilo; therefore, the kilo would be worth $101.50. The
Afghan opium sold reportedly did average about ten percent morphine. Although the sale of
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The same dramatic increase can be seen in cannabis seizures. 01
Kabul, long a haven for the drug subculture of the United States and
Europe, 10 2 is now a closed city for Western drug users. Foreigners
found smoking hashish are jailed and must pay heavy fines before
being released. While there have been no reports of police brutality, 10 3
at least with respect to foreign prisoners,' 10 4 the conditions in Afghan
prisons' 0 5 tend to encourage a fast tender of the required fines. Fines
may run as high as one and one half million afghanis (27,000-
28,000 dollars), 10 6 depending on the nature of the offense and the
amount of drugs involved. The fines can be worked off at the rate of
fifty afghanis for each day in jail. 107
Much remains to be done, however, betore these efforts can effec-
tively deter drug smuggling. Three concerns are of immediate impor-
tance. First, corruption is an intractable problem in the Afghan
National Police. 108 Recently several score of officers were jailed for
seized opium does not violate the terms of the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs (Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, May 15, 1967, art. 24, § 5b, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298,
520 U.N.T.S. 204 (effective June 24, 1967)), the price paid to the Afghans was significantly above
the world market price for opium (approximately forty-nine dollars per kilo) and could presage
attempts by other governments to sell contraband opium in the same way.
The question of when opium will be considered contraband raises difficult legal questions.
Conceivably, a country could outlaw poppy cultivation but disregard illegal cultivation until after
the harvest. Once harvested, the opium could be seized as contraband and then sold on the world
market without violating any international agreements. Such practices, however, would seem to
violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the Convention.
101. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, Annex M.
102. See N.Y. Times, May 30, 1973, at 12, col. 1. For a poignant report of the drg-related
death of one American girl in Kabul see N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1972, at 1, cols. 6-7.
103. For mention of brutality in Afghan jails see L Dupree, Afghanistan 564 (1973).
"Bastinado," the beating of the soles of the feet, was once a common method of extracting
confessions. Id.
104. Based on the author's conversations in Kabul, it seems that Western prisoners are
treated better than Afghan prisoners. Westerners often are kept in separate cells and have their
trials advanced. The primary complaints of Western prisoners center around the unsanitary
conditions of Afghan jails and the brutality inflicted on them by other prisoners. Field Study,
supra note 19.
105. As one author noted, "Afghan jails are designed to punish, not rehabilitate." L. Dupree,
Afghanistan 533 (1973). Traditional Islamic Law does not forbid the use of beatings to extract a
confession. Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6 Intl & Comp. L.Q. 49, 52
(1957).
106. An American caught with 286 kilos of hashish received the fine mentioned in the text.
Another American caught with 1.3 kilos of hashish was fined only 20,000 afghanis (approximately
$368). Field Study, supra note 19. Until the fine is paid, bail is generally refused.
107. Id.
108. For references to corruption in Afghan narcotics enforcement agencies see N.Y. Times,
Nov. 18, 1972, at 10, cols. 3-5. Since the change in government on July 17, 1973, however,
efforts have been made to correct this problem.
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allegedly taking bribes. To discourage this temptation among the
officers of the newly created ASU, the government has approved
payment of bonuses based on performance.
Second, regional law enforcement cooperation between the nations
of the area is almost nonexistent. For example, there is no sharing of
intelligence between Afghan and Iranian police. They appear to look
upon each other with condescension and mistrust, the Iranians think-
ing the Afghans incompetent and the Afghans considering the Iranians
dishonest. There are, of course, adequate forums available for high and
middle level contacts between the countries. Turkey, Iran, Afghanis-
tan and Pakistan all belong to the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle East. In May 1974, the Sub-
Commission recommended annual meetings of the chiefs of the central
police of these nations, inviting Interpol to participate. 10 9 Despite
rhetoric approving this recommendation, it has not yet been im-
plemented. In 1956, Afghanistan and Iran signed a border agreement
to achieve closer cooperation, but here too there are few signs of any
tangible cooperative efforts. 10 Events of the past few years, however,
demonstrate why such regional cooperation is essential. Locally pro-
duced heroin has appeared for the first time in Afghanistan, and
reportedly, this heroin now has begun to appear in Iran as well.111
Similarly, three hashish oil labs have been uncovered in Afghanistan,
and hashish oil has been seized in Iran and Pakistan, indicating that
this new and potent hallucinogen is being distributed widely in the
region. 1 2
109. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 21.
110. Id. at 9. As if to admit that little was being done to implement this border agreement,
the Sub-Commission suggested that an Afghan-Iranian working group be created to foster
cooperation "without prejudice to the Border Agreement which is in existence between these two
countries." Id. at 21.
11. Field Study, supra note 19. It is, of course, quite difficult to prove the precise origins of a
particular quantity of heroin. But Afghan informers have reported the existence of a mobile
heroin laboratory in the country, and 32.7 kilograms of heroin were seized on a bus en route from
Zahedan to Teheran. Zahedan is situated at the juncture of the Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani
border. Report of the Government of Iran to the United Nations for the Calendar Year 1974 on
the Working of the International Treaties on Narcotic Drugs 15 (1975) (on file at Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Government of Iran]. Three of the smugglers were
from Pakistan. Kayhan Int'l, Oct. 10, 1974. There are reports, however, that the actual
processing of this heroin took place in a village in western Afghanistan. Field Study, supra note
19. Recently a morphine base lab was seized in. Pakistan. Id.
112. For reference to the seizure of hashish oil in Iran see Report of the Government of Iran,
supra note 11, at 16-17. For reference to the existence of hashish oil in Pakistan and Afghanistan
see First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 4, 8. On the general subject of hashish
oil (liquid cannabis) see Hearing Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5, 13-14 (1973).
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Finally, to make narcotics control efforts more effective, the drug
law of Afghanistan should be recodified and strengthened. It is pres-
ently a confused, arbitrary set of provisions lacking a realistic penalty
structure. Under existing legislation, cultivation of or commerce in
opium is forbidden; however, exceptions are made for legitimate
medical needs. 113 Penalties for violating this law are contained, not in
the text of this legislation, but in separate legislation-the anti-
smuggling law. 114 Under the anti-smuggling law, a person can be
imprisoned for up to three years for illicitly smuggling certain listed
goods, such as drugs or commodities controlled by government
monopoly. An American lawyer might be troubled by certain aspects
of this law. For instance, smuggling appears to be a flexible legal
concept; transporting contraband goods between two different parts of
the country without crossing international borders is treated as smug-
gling."l 5 Similarly, the mere hoarding of government monopoly items
such as sugar or wheat has been held to be a form of smuggling."16
On the other hand, the law makes no provision for conspiracy
prosecutions-an unfortunate omission in a drug statute.
The United Nations Division of Narcotics Drugs has offered Af-
ghanistan help in drafting new drug legislation.1 17 Hopefully, with
United Nations assistance, Afghanistan will soon adopt modern drug
statutes consistent with its own law enforcement needs and with its
obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
While increasing its efforts in the law enforcement field, the gov-
ernment of Afghanistan is slowly becoming aware of its own domestic
drug problem. Traditionally, Afghanistan has viewed its drug control
efforts as something necessitated by its treaty commitments to other
nations. It was assumed that any illegal opium and hashish grown in
the country would find its way to Europe, the United States or Iran;
consequently, little attention was paid to drug consumption in Af-
ghanistan itself. The government's assessment of the situation may
have been tragically inaccurate. Not only does widespread cultivation
of the poppy exist in Badakhshan and Nangrahar-two provinces
where government control is somewhat tenuous-but massive addic-
tion may exist there as well.118 In Badakhshan, for example, it has
113. Law Concerning Prevention of Growth, Trade, Buying, Selling, Importation, Exporta-
tion and Use of Opium in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. No. EINL.1958J13 (1958).
114. Id. art. 4.
115. Field Study, supra note 19.
116. Id.
117. Id. For reference to Afghanistan's consideration of new narcotics legislation see First
Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 9.
118. For a reference to illegal poppy cultivation in these provinces see id. at 10. Recently,
however, the govenor of Badakhshan has formally outlawed poppy cultivation in the provinces.
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been reported that of an estimated population of 350,000 to 470,000,119
between 40,000 and 50,000 persons are regular consumers of opium,
that is roughly ten percent of the population. 120
Other estimates of the number of addicts in Badakhshan run
higher. 121 Travellers in the Wakhan-Pamir corridor in northeastern
Afghanistan have reported particularly severe opium abuse in that part
of the country. 122 One reason for such pockets of severe addiction is
Afghanistan's poverty and its consequent need for medical services.
There are three health centers and only one hospital in the entire
province of Badakhshan; these service nearly one half million people
who are spread out across a mountainous and harsh terrain. Not
unexpectedly, Afghanistan does not have one separate drug rehabilita-
tion program in the entire country. In an effort to remedy this
situation, the United Nations has offered Afghanistan technical and
financial assistance which will serve as a beginning for drug treatment
efforts in the country. 123
It would be remiss to end any discussion of drug control efforts in
Afghanistan without some mention of the cultivation of the opium
poppy in the Hilmand Valley. Because of the fertility of this region of
Afghanistan, some have argued that the valley could become a major
agricultural area-perhaps one of the largest in the whole of Asia. 124
Over the past several years, the United States government has con-
tributed millions of dollars in aid to develop the region, building a
hydroelectric plant and various irrigation systems. With this American
assistance, the wheat yield in the area has dramatically increased. But
in 1973, disturbing reports began to appear in the press that Afghan
farmers in the Hilmand region were growing poppies on land de-
veloped with American aid moneys.1 25 Embarrassed by these stories,
the Afghan government strongly committed itself to the prevention of
opium cultivation in the region. Whether the government has lived up
The information on addiction in these areas was derived from conversations with knowledgeable
officials in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Field Study, supra note 19.
119. One 1970 estimate sets the population of Badakhshan at 344,000. 1 Encyclopedia
Britannica, Macropaedia 169 (1974).
120. Field Study, supra note 19.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Wakhan-Pamir area of Afghanistan comprises the panhandle-shaped corridor in
the northeastern portion of the country. See L. Dupree, Afghanistan 4-6 (1973).
123. Field Study, supra note 19. For earlier U.N. studies relating to narcotics control see
First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 10. For a general survey of U.N.
assistance to Afghanistan see Kabul Times, June 26, 1975, at 3.
124. For reference to the Hilmand Valley's potential for agricultural development see L.
Dupree, Afghanistan 37 (1973).
125. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
[Vol. 44
DRUG POLICY IN IRAN
to that commitment is still a subject of some debate. American officials
are hopeful, but continue to monitor the situation regularly. 12 6
E. Pakistan
As on the border between Afghanistan and Iran, smuggling over the
Pakistan-Iranian border is a daily occupation for many. Pakistan has a
large addict population and contraband opium circulates within the
country to feed that population. It would be unusual if there were not
some seepage of this opium over the frontiers into Iran. Because of a
history of tribal unrest in the primary opium producing areas, the
government of Pakistan must move with extreme caution in trying to
put an end to the illicit cultivation and smuggling.
In Pakistan, poppy cultivation must be licensed by the govern-
ment. 127 In 1973, the government reported that 1,329 hectares were
licensed to grow opium. 128 The government buys this opium from the
licensed farmer at an average price of 200 rupees (approximately
twenty dollars), the price depending on the quality of the product. 12 9
Unfortunately, the government price per kilogram is far below the
price paid by illicit traffickers. 130 As a consequence of this price
disparity, there are thousands of hectares of unlicensed poppy cultiva-
tion in the country, primarily in the North West Frontier Province
which borders on Afghanistan. Administratively this province is di-
vided into two divisions, depending on the extent of central govern-
ment control in each area. 131 The so-called "tribal" areas, where the
central g9vernment in Islamabad exercises little control, are run
mostly according to tribal laws and customs. The other division of the
province-the "provincially administered" area-is further subdivided
into two sections-the "settled" areas and the "merged" areas. Settled
areas are totally integrated into the legal structure of the country while
merged areas are in a state of gradual transition from tribal to settled
status. There is extensive illicit poppy cultivation in many of the tribal
126. The 1971 Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a) (Supp. IMI,
1973), permit the President to cut off all aid to any nation that does not cooperate in stemming
drug traffic.
127. Report of the Government of Pakistan on the Working of the International Treaties on
Narcotic Drugs for the Calendar Year 1973, at 3 (1974) (on file at Fordham Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Report of the Government of Pakistan].
128. Id. There were 19,463 licensed farmers using these hectares. Id.
129. Field Study, supra note 19. For an earlier schedule of government opium payments, see
Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, Poppy Cultivation and Opium Distribution in Pakistan [hereinafter cited
as Siraj-ul-Haq-Mfahmud], in CENTO Seminar, supra note 34, at 137.
130. Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, supra note 129, at 137.
131. Id. at 131-35.
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and merged areas and little can be done to stop it. 13 2 Entry of
strangers into these regions is dangerous, and the government must
handle the situation delicately. The cardinal principle seems to be that
the less involvement in tribal affairs by the government the better.
In theory, all of the legal raw opium grown in Pakistan is purchased
by the Excise and Taxation Department and then sent to the Govern-
ment Opium Alkaloid Factory in Lahore for processing.' 33 After
processing, the opium, which now has a morphine content of nine to
ten percent, is sold to pharmaceutical companies or to the nation's
opium addicts through licensed shops. 134
Pakistan's licensed opium shops appear to contribute to the problem
of illegal poppy cultivation and drug smuggling, although the situation
has not been studied. There are approximately 332 licensed opium
vendors in Pakistan, most of them concentrated in Punjab and Sind
provinces. 135 Each opium vendor buys at auction his license and the
right to sell opium at a designated place. These auctions annually earn
the government of Pakistan over sixteen million rupees (approximately
one and one half million dollars); some individual licenses may cost as
much as 250,000 rupees (approximately $25,000).136 After obtaining a
license, a vendor receives a quota of opium which, in theory, is resold
to addicts. Unfortunately, any person, whether or not an addict, can
freely purchase up to 23.32 grams of opium from a licensed vendor, 1
37
with little preventing him from purchasing more opium at a second
shop. 138 It is estimated that the government annually distributes over
5,500 kilos of opium through these licensed shops.
139
In addition, the inadequacies of the legitimate opium distribution
program are exacerbated by illegal opium distributions by the licensed
vendors. The amount paid for a license at auction is often higher than
the retail price of the quota of government opium given to the licensee.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 139.
134. Id. at 140.
135. Id.
136. Id.; Field Study, supra note 19.
137. See Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, supra note 129, at 140. See also Report of the Government
of Pakistan, supra note 127, at 5.
138. Although it is illegal for an adult to have more than 23.22 grams in his possession at any
one time, licensed vendors keep records of frequent purchasers only. Report of the Government of
Pakistan, supra note 127, at 5. A sporadic purchaser can go from one shop to the next and buy
large quantities of opium with impunity. Some form of central narcotics register might reduce
these abuses. The use of such a register in the United States would cause constitutional right of
privacy problems. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), appeal docketed
sub nom., Whalen v. Roe, 44 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1975) (No. 75-839); N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 1975, at 37, col. 1.
139. Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, supra note 129, at 140.
[Vol. 44
DRUG POLICY IN IRAN
In order to make a profit, the licensee must sell contraband opium1 40
or, in some cases, contraband hashish. 141 Because of the political
situation in the North West Frontier Province, a supply of these illicit
drugs is readily available for distribution. In effect, the system permits
the vendors to operate as licensed drug pushers. As a result, the opium
vendors have been blamed for contributing to a massive addiction
problem in Pakistan. Although there are no published statistics, some
claim that in Lahore, a city of over two million people, perhaps as
much as six percent of the population is addicted.1 42 The overall figure
in urban areas may approximate 7.5 percent of the population.1 43
Until illicit cultivation and consumption are adequately controlled,
little can be done about smuggling. The government is beginning to
take some forceful measures aimed at ultimately bringing these prob-
lems under control. In March 1973, the Pakistan Narcotics Control
Board was created; it is composed of officials from both the provinces
and the central government. 44 The Board has been given wide
authority to act as an advisory, coordinating and controlling agency in
the field of narcotics. In line with its mandate, the Board has fixed
target dates to reduce poppy cultivation first in the settled areas, then
in the merged areas and finally in the tribal areas. Field investigative
units have been set up to police the reduced cultivation. 145 The United
States has supplied transportation and telecommunication equipment
to outfit twenty-five of these field units. 1 46 Composed of specially
trained officers equipped with sophisticated detection apparatus, these
units will provide new strength in the poppy control effort. The United
Nations has also offered technical and financial assistance in the law
enforcement field but, more importantly, has embarked upon a de-
velopment project in the Buner area of the North West Frontier
Province, the ultimate aim of which is to provide another means of
livelihood for opium farmers. 47
Although these new initiatives are laudable, a complete solution to
140. Id. at 141.
141. Field Study, supra note 19.
142. Id.
143. Id. Some experts claim, however, that there are only 100,000 opium users in the
country. See Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, Pakistan, Epidemiology of Drug Use in the Regional
Countries, in CENTO Seminar, supra note 34, at 47.
144. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at Annex IL
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Field Study, supra note 19. See also First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58,
at 7. The so-called "Green Revolution" with its emphasis on increased agricultural productivity
through the use of new crop strains has been of great benefit in Punjab province, but not in the
North West Frontier Province. See R. Blackburn, Explosion in a Subcontinent 276-79 (1975).
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illicit opium cultivation and drug smuggling will require more radical
measures. First, it would seem that little headway can be made until
licensed opium shops are either abolished or their mode of operation
upgraded.1 48 If the government wishes to distribute opium to its
addicts, a more tightly controlled program must be substituted. Be-
cause of the flagrant abuses connected with the existing system, there
are some indications that government and provincial administrators
are already beginning to think along these lines. 149
Second, Pakistan's drug laws are old and confusing and require
change.150 Efforts should be made to draft legislation to meet modem
drug control needs. First priority should be given to increasing drug
offense penalties. Although harsh penalties alone have never solved a
country's drug problem, 15 1 they are a necessary component of a
successful drug strategy. The existing penalty structure for violating
Pakistan's drug laws sets the maximum jail sentence at only two years,
with a maximum fine of 2,000 rupees (approximately $200).152 Thus,
even though Pakistan prosecuted 18,981 drug offenders in 1973, all of
those convicted will be out of jail by the end of 1975.153 Failure to
enact more severe criminal penalties may cause Pakistan to become a
haven for illicit drug manufacturers and traffickers avoiding tougher
drug laws in other countries.
Third, Pakistan should make dramatic efforts to raise the standard
of living in the North West Frontier Province to provide opium
farmers with alternative means of support. Although some efforts are
being made, as evidenced by the U.N. pilot program, border tensions
with Afghanistan hinder the necessary initiatives. 15 4
Although the primary government effort has been aimed at stopping
opium traffic, illegal hashish cultivation and abuse is also a problem in
Pakistan. Every year the government seizes large amounts of cannabis
148. For an alternative proposal for opium distribution in Pakistan see Strnj-ul-Haq-
Mahmud, supra note 129, at 141-43.
149. Field Study, supra note 19.
150. Siraj-ul-Haq-Mahmud, Pakistan, Epidemiology of Drug Use in the Regional Countries,
in CENTO Seminar, supra note 34, at 52.
151. For a recent judicial questioning of harsh legislative measures aimed at controlling the
drug traffic see People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
152. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Illicit
Traffic, Pakistan 2, U.N. Doc. E/IT/1973/90 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Illicit Traffic, Pakistan].
153. Id.
154. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1975, at 10, col. 3; see The Economist, Feb. 15, 1975, at 39; Id.,
Dec. 7, 1974, at 57. Afghanistan would like to see self-determination for Pakistan's tribal peoples
in both Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. It is Afghanistan's hope that given
such self-determination, the Pathans in the North West Frontier Province would vote to align
themselves with Afghanistan where the Pathans are the dominant tribe. Until political stability
returns to the area, significant economic development is unlikely.
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drugs in both resin (hashish) and leaf form. 155 Liquid cannabis (hash-
ish oil) has also appeared in the country. 1 6 As with the poppy, much
of the cannabis cultivation takes place in the tribal areas of the North
West Frontier Province where it is not feasible for the government to
police. 157 Researchers in Rawalpindi, however, are attempting to
develop biological methods for destruction of the cannabis plant;lss
certain types of insects feed on the cannabis plant and in time Pakistan
may move to controll its illicit cannabis growth in this fashion. ' 5 9 Aerial
sensing devices which can detect marijuana growth may also provide
some assistance in limiting cultivation. But, as with so many other
countries in the Near East, success of any project depends on the
strength of government control and commitment. Pakistan may have
the commitment but, at this time, does not appear to have sufficient
control to implement many of the programs it has undertaken.
F. Conclusion
Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan have traditionally served as
opium producing nations. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, however,
there is no adequate government control over the main areas of opium
production. Some of this opium supplies the needs of the addicts in
each of these countries, but the overproduction gravitates toward other
markets where there is an unfulfilled demand. To a large extent, Iran
is that market, although Turkey has been the traditional source of the
morphine base used to produce Iranian heroin. As Iran's heroin
problem grows, there may be increased morphine base smuggling from
Turkey. On the other hand, if the Turkish law enforcement agencies
effectively police the new poppy straw opium process, perhaps Af-
ghanistan or Pakistan will become primary suppliers of morphine base
and heroin to Iran. Already there have been clear signs of heroin
manufacturing in these nations.16 0 Iran does not exist in isolation, and
the drug abuse conditions in these neighboring countries will necessar-
ily play a significant role in the success of Iran's attempts to contain its
drug abuse problem. 161
155. Illicit Traffic, Pakistan, supra note 152, at 2.
156. Id.
157. First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58, at 4.
158. Id.
159. One insect, the "Oxythris canabensis," reportedly survives on the cannabis plant and
may be a potent weapon in the biological control of cannabis growth. See Kayhan Intl, Apr. 4,
1972, at 6, col. 3. Other insects eat the opium poppy. One is called "Centhorrynchus marula-
alba." Field Study, supra note 19.
160. See note 111 supra.
161. Indeed, the influx of drugs from Turkey and Afghanistan forced Iran in 1969 to end its
ban on poppy cultivation. See McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 5, at 495-98; text accompanying
notes 270-71 infra.
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II. DRUG ADDICTION IN IRAN
A. Drugs of Abuse
The four principal drugs of abuse in Iran are opium, shireh, heroin
and hashish.162 Opium is produced from the latex of papaver
somniferum-the opium poppy. The white latex which dries into a
dark brown substance is called raw opium. Raw opium is processed
into prepared opium by extracting moisture and natural impurities
such as small pieces of stem or leaves from the latex. This prepared
opium is usually smoked in an Indian pipe-a wooden stem with a
bowl at the end-or eaten. "Eaten" is perhaps a misnomer since the
opium is usually brewed in tea or some other liquid concoction.
163
Shireh is derived from the residue of prepared opium, sukhteh, 164
which is left in the bowl of the opium pipe after smoking. Usually
about one-fifth of the total amount of the opium burned remains after
use. If the Iranian raw opium has a morphine content of ten to thirteen
percent, 6 -5 the shireh will have an average morphine content of sixteen
percent. 166
Heroin is the most recent major addition to drug abuse in Iran. The
drug is made from morphine base which is processed from opium. 167
Generally the heroin seized in Iran is not the pure white Marseilles
number four heroin, but rather an inferior brown-colored variety. The
heroin is usually burned on a piece of tinfoil and the fumes inhaled.
Among Chinese heroin users, this traditional method is called "chasing
the dragon."'1 68 The heroin may also be smoked in a cigarette. Re-
cently, injectable grade heroin has been seized in Iran and some
addicts have confessed to "mainlining" the drug. 169
162. For a more detailed description of drugs of abuse in Iran see McLaughlin & Quinn,
supra note 5, at 473-80.
163. In seventeenth century Isfahan, "Kooknar" shops, where opium was served brewed in
water, were quite popular. H.A. Azarakhsh, Drug Addiction in Iran 2 (copy of speech on file at
Fordhan Law Review). In the West, too, opium was drunk. For example, laudanum, a tincture
of opium, was a favorite method of taking opium. See R. Lingeman, Drugs From A to Z: A
Dictionary 124 (1969).
164. Shireh and sukhteh are Farsi words. In China and the United States, shireh is referred
to as yenshee.
165. Neligan, supra note 5, at 17.
166. Id. at 20. Some claim that the morphine content of shireh may run as high as eighteen
percent. Field Study, supra note 19.
167. For brief descriptions of the chemistry of heroin processing see The Heroin Trail, supra
note 30, at 13-14; World Opium Survey, supra note 48, at 415-16.
168. For a description of the various methods of smoking heroin see McLaughlin & Quinn,
supra note 5, at 478.
169. Seven percent of the addicts interviewed in one study answered that they regularly
injected heroin. Others admitted to injecting as well as inhaling the drug. See Norman, Survey of
Drug-Dependent Males at Vanak Hospital, Teheran, December 1974, at Table 7 [unpublished
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The final drug frequently abused in Iran is hashish, the resin of the
cannabis plant. It is much more potent than either marijuana or ganja
which are, respectively, the leaves and flowering tops of the cannabis
plant. Hashish abuse in Iran tends to center among students and the
more au-courant members of the upper class-groups who have been
exposed to the drug in Europe 17 0-but there is limited hashish use
among the lower strata of society and among certain dervishes. 7 1
Other drugs are abused in Iran on a lesser scale. LSD has been
found in the local illicit market. 172 Cocaine abuse is rather rare, but
there are reported instances of it. 17 3 Cocaine abuse may become more
prevalent if the increased use of cocaine in the United States 174 and
Europe eventually spreads to Iran. Barbiturate abuse is increasing
more rapidly. 175 Of twenty-five addicts recently interviewed at the
Vanak Drug Clinic in Teheran, seven admitted to using pills-
generally Vesparax, a depressant composed of phenobarbital and
atarax. 176 Although technically forbidden by the Koran, alcohol is sold
openly in stores in Teheran and widely used. 177 Iranians have tradi-
tionally enjoyed the pleasures of wine; in fact, the wines produced in
Shiraz are highly prized. 178 As a result of this widespread use, al-
coholism is not an uncommon problem in the country.
The primary addiction problem in Iran, however, involves opium
and shireh abuse. As of May 21, 1975, there were 169,512 registered
addicts in Iran 79 who annually consume approximately 180 tons of
study on file at Fordham Law Review and hereinafter cited as Study I]. For an earlier reference
to the injection of morphine and heroin in Iran see Noorbakhsh, Detection, Treatment and
Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts, U.N. Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement
Officers, Teheran, April 5-14, 1966, at 4.
170. See Kamm, They Shoot Opium Smugglers in Iran, but.... N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1973,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 44, cols. 4-5 [hereinafter cited as Kamm].
171. Field Study, supra note 19.
172. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note Ill, at 17.
173. See Field Study, supra note 19; Noorbakhsh, supra note 169, at 1.
174. McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 Cornell L
Rev. 537, 538 (1973).
175. See Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 12. Barbiturate abuse,
however, seems to be more widespread than the tone of the report would indicate. Field Study,
supra note 19.
176. Field Study, supra note 19.
177. For reference to the use of vodka in Iran see Power, Some Comments On Law Related
Problems In Iran, 19 St. Louis L.J. 277, 288 (1975).
178. For reference to the wines of Shiraz and the Persians' general fondness for the drink see
2 G. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question 506-07 (1966); notes 7 & 8 supra.
179. Field Study, supra note 19. The government reported that the number of addicts in the
registered program was 159,149 at the close of 1974. Report of the Government of Iran, supra
note 111, at 7. This means that the registered addict program increased at a rate of 2,000 per
month in early 1975.
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government opium. The number of opium and shireh addicts who
receive supplies from illicit sources cannot be determined precisely, but
is variously estimated at from 200,000 to 500,000. Assuming that each
illicit user of opium uses three grams of opium per day and assuming
Iranian authorities intercept five percent of the illicit drugs circulating
in the country,180 Iran's published figure of the amount of opium
seized in 1974-9,848 kilograms " 81- would indicate approximately
180,000 illegal opium users. 18 2 But this rather mechanical approxima-
tion is probably far too low since it overlooks the fact that many illegal
addicts-perhaps as many as fifty percent-receive their supplies from
registered addicts. 183 Thus, a more realistic assessment of the number
of illegal opium users in Iran might range from 350,000 to 400,000.
Adding this figure to the approximately 170,000 registered users indi-
cates that the combined legal and illegal opium users approximates
600,000, nearly two percent of Iran's population of thirty-two million.
B. The Spread of Addiction in Nineteenth Century Iran
Although opium has existed in Iran in some form or another for
centuries, widespread addiction was not known in the country until
the nineteenth century. There are many reasons why addiction spread
during these years. For analytic convenience they will be grouped into
four categories-medical factors, economic factors, the influence of
foreign powers and traditional Persian national characteristics.
1. Medical Factors
Serious disease and natural disaster have always been facts of life in
Iran. Along the subtropical Caspian littoral, malaria is endemic. 184
Outbreaks of typhoid, cholera, polio and amoebic dysentery occur with
some frequency. At various times in Iran's history, famines and
earthquakes'8" have taken their toll of human life. But despite the
180. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, the U.S. Bureau of Customs was thought to
have seized less than five percent of the heroin smuggled into this country. E. Brecher, Licit and
Illicit Drugs, The Consumers Union Report on Narcotics, Stimulants, Depressants, Inhalants,
Hallucinogens, and Marijuana-including Caffeine, Nicotine, and Alcohol 93 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Brecher].
181. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 13.
182. This figure of 180,000 was calculated by first multiplying the amount of opium seized in
1974 (9,848 kilograms) by 1,000 to obtain the number of grams seized in the year. This number
was then multiplied by twenty (since customs will admit to intercepting five percent of what Is
entering a country each year) and then that figure was divided by one addict's yearly opium
requirements (three grams times 365 days).
183. Field Study, supra note 19. See also notes 266-69 infra and accompanying text.
184. Fisher, Physical Geography, in I The Cambridge History of Iran 49 (W. B. Fisher ed.
1968).
185. On Iran's susceptibility to earthquake devastation see id. at 9, 11.
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prevalence of disease and disaster, medical facilities in Iran have
always been woefully inadequate. Even today with 11,400 practicing
physicians 186 there is still a critical shortage of doctors and hospitals.
In September 1970, the physician/population ratio in Teheran was
estimated to be one to 900; in other cities the estimated ratio was one
to 4,350. 187 In rural areas, the ratio may drop to one to 10,000.188 For
example, in Lurestan Province there is one doctor for every 9,000
people. 189 To help alleviate this shortage, foreign doctors are being
brought in from India and the Phillipines. 190 The statistics on the
number of nurses indicate even greater inadequacies, there being only
between five and six thousand in the country. 191 The figures for
available hospital beds are no brighter. In some parts of Lurestan
Province, there is one hospital bed for every 7,340 people.192 The goal
is to increase the national ratio to fifteen beds for every 10,000 people.
If these are the statistics for the 1970s, one can imagine what the
comparable statistics must have been during the 1870s.
With such a staggering lack of health services, it is not surprising
that Iranians turned to home remedies for relief of pain and disease.
With the increased availability of opium in the nineteenth century,1 93
people began to use the drug as a panacea for every ailment' 19 4 Opium
is both an anti-diarrheal and a pain killer. As one writer has remarked:
"Probably doctors all the world over would ask for opium to be left,
were they told that all drugs save one were to be taken from them."' 95
Unfortunately, opium use was not confined to treating serious illnesses
such as dysentery and malaria. Women began to use it for menstrual
pains, men for fatigue, frostbite and insomnia, and parents to ease
child teething. 196 The famous nineteenth century Middle Eastern
scholar, E. G. Browne, reported that he smoked opium while in Persia
to relieve the pain of opthalmia. 197 Since it is a tranquillizer of sorts,
opium also became a standard remedy for psychological stress. Thus,
186. Teheran J., June 10, 1975, at 4, col. 3.
187. U.N. Interagency Mission, Population and Family Planning in Iran 17, U.N. Doc.
TAO/IRA60 (1971).
188. Id.
189. Kayhan Int'l, June 4, 1975, at 2, col. 4.
190. Teheran J., June 8, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
191. Id., June 10, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
192. Kayhan Int'l, June 4, 1975, at 2, col. 4. With 1.54 million hospital beds in 1973, the
United States had approximately one bed for every 150 people. See Tune, Aug. 18, 1975, at 55.
193. See text accompanying notes 202-08 infra.
194. See Leong, Cross-Cultural Influences on Ideas About Drugs, 26 Bull. Narc., OcL-Dec.
1974, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Leong].
195. Neligan, supra note 5, at 22.
196. Field Study, supra note 19. Opium also was rumored to be a cure for diabetes and lung
conditions. Leong, supra note 194, at 2.
197. E.G. Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians 476 (3d ed. 1950).
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over the course of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
centuries, large numbers of "medical addicts" appeared in Iran-their
addiction caused by a too free and frequent use of opium to relieve
pain and stress.
2. Economic Factors
Before 1853 Iran did not export opium. Beginning in that year,
however, the country embarked upon an aggressive opium export
policy. 198 The reason for the change was economic: Iran wanted to buy
Ejuropean goods and needed foreign currency to pay for them. Since
opium was in great demand in Europe and Asia, it could provide a
source of foreign currency. In the West, there was a market for opium
in London, and the Iranian ambassador to the Court of St. James tried
to garner a share of that market. 199 Although early shipments of
Iranian opium to England were of poor quality, an excellent quality
opium was exported after 1870.200 Opium, like other Iranian exports
such as turquoise, was shipped to Europe via the Turkish port of
Trebizond on the Black Sea. 201 The primary opium markets, however,
were not in Europe but in the Orient, especially China and Hong Kong
where millions of people smoked the drug. The Opium Wars of
1840-1842 and 1856-1858 between England and China ended China's
efforts to block the importation of foreign opium. Sensing economic
advantage, the government of Iran did not stand idly by but moved to
capture part of this huge market.
In order to have sufficient quantities of opium to export to Europe
and to the Orient, domestic production had to be increased. Existing
poppy fields were rapidly extended and land that had been used for
crops such as grain and sugar cane was put under poppy cultiva-
tion. 20 2 The vagaries of nature and politics convinced silk and cotton
farmers to switch to opium. A blight in 1864 ruined the silk indus-
try,20 3 and the end of the American Civil War in 1865 dealt a mortal
blow to the Iranian cotton farmer who had taken to cultivating cotton
when the blockade of southern ports prevented American cotton from
198. G. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question 499 (1892).
199. H.A. Azarakhsh, Drug Addiction in Iran 2 (copy of speech on file at Fordham Law
Review).
200. Neligan, supra note 5, at 13.
201. Because so much Iranian merchandise reached Europe via this Turkish port, Europeans
often mistook Turkey for the producer of certain Iranian goods. For example, turquoise, an
Iranian semi-precious stone, was named after the French word for Turkey, undoubtedly because
the turquoise was considered of Turkish origin as it reached Europe via Trebizond. For reference
to Persian opium being mistaken as Turkish see id. at 13.
202. A. Le Messurier, From London to Bokhara and A Ride Through Persia 248 (1889).
203. Johns, supra note 5, at 32.
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reaching world markets. Once the war ended, however, American
cotton quickly regained its preeminence.20 4
Opium soon became Iran's major export item.ZOs Where in 1859 Iran
exported 42,000 pounds of opium, the figure had reached 875,000
pounds in 1914.206 Although the figure declined slightly after World
War I, it soon surpassed pre-war levels, reaching 1,130,054 pounds by
the year 1925-1926.2 °7
With so much acreage under cultivation, opium was readily avail-
able not only for export but also for domestic consumption. Unfortu-
nately, the decades between 1860 and 1880 provided sufficient cause
for many Iranians to turn to opium. In 1861 there was famine in Iran;
in- 1871 and 1872 a plague appeared, and three years later a second
plague and famine struck.2 0 8 Reportedly, two thirds of the population
in large cities died from these double disasters. 20 9 Contemporary
writers graphically described the drug situation during the last decades
of the nineteenth century. In Isfahan, one traveller reported that as far
as the eye could see there was nothing but fields of poppies. 21 0 In
Kerman, the opium habit was perhaps worse than anywhere else.
Over forty percent of the city's population was allegedly addicted to
opium. Women smoked at home while the men smoked in the bazaars,
in coffee houses or under archways. 2 1 In the eastern province of
Khorassan, there were reports of heavy addiction-in many cases
among the well-to-do.2 12 One traveller during this period estimated
that nine out of ten of the aged in Persia took one to five grams of
opium daily. 213
3. Foreign Influences
Historically, drugs have been used as a method of furthering politi-
cal or economic domination. For example, in South America during
the sixteenth century, the Spaniards used coca leaves to pay Indian
204. See C. Wills, Persia As It Is 234 (1886).
205. Le Messurier, supra note 202, at 248. One commentator remarked that opium ranked
third in foreign trade in the 1920s, coming after oil and carpets. Neligan, supra note S, at 39.
206. Neligan, supra note 5, at 39.
207. Id. at 40. For a discussion of Persia's international stance vis i vis its opium trade during
the early twentieth century see E. MacCalum, Twenty Years of Persian Opium (1908-1928)
(1928).
208. Le Messurier, supra note 202, at 248. For reference to the conditions in Persian
Kurdistan during the 1870s see A. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia 162-63 (1953). In
Persia, partial or total crop failures may occur one year in five. Id. at 391 n.3.
209. Le Messurier, supra note 202, at 248.
210. Wills, supra note 204, at 234-35.
211. See Neligan, supra note 5, at 29, 33; C. Rice, Mary Bird in Persia 127 (1916).
212. P. Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran 402-03 (1902).
213. Wills, supra note 204, at 234.
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laborers mining for Andean gold.214 The coca allegedly increased the
workers' productivity and reduced their hunger. In order that the
"christianization" of the natives would not suffer, the Catholic Church
even rationalized that coca "was a mere adjunct of food" and therefore
could be chewed before receiving the Holy Eucharist. 215 In more
contemporary times, the Japanese, beginning with their conquest of
Manchuria in 1931, encouraged opium use in China and in other
conquered nations as a method of keeping these subjugated states
somnolent and incapable of struggling against their conquerors. 216
Some argue that similar forces were at work in Iran in the nineteenth
century. India was considered a vital economic colony by England.
Opium use was widespread among Indians, and, to lessen the chance
of invasion or political domination of India by other nations, opium
abuse allegedly was fostered in contiguous countries such as China and
Iran. 217 Within Iran itself, the easternmost regions of the country-those
areas closest to India-had the inost severe addiction problem. 218 Af-
ghanistan, long a trouble spot for England, was never fully subjugated
and hence is relatively free of addiction.2 19 Although such speculations
are tantalizing, they are simply that-speculations. There are, how-
ever, more demonstrable connections between foreign influences and
drug abuse in Iran.
First it must be recalled that British and Russian economic interests
in nineteenth century Persia were significant. Always in need of
revenues, the Shahs of the Qajar dynasty were quite willing to sell
concessions to foreigners. In 1872, a British subject, Baron de Reuter,
was granted a comprehensive nation-wide monopoly over railroad
construction, mining and banking. 220 Although the concession was
ultimately cancelled, it led the Shah in 1889 to award de Reuter
another concession-the right to organize the Imperial Bank of Per-
sia. 22 1 A year later a tobacco monopoly was awarded to another
Englishman-a fact which led to widespread Persian resentment of
British influence.2 22 The Russians, not to be outdone by the British,
214. Hodge, Coca, 56 Natural Hist., Feb. 1947, at 86, 87.
215. N. Taylor, Narcotics: Nature's Dangerous Gifts 65 (1966) (emphasis deleted).
216. Johns, supra note 5, at 37.
217. Similarly, it has been speculated that the British defeat in the American Revolution may
have contributed to England's use of opium as a weapon of colonialism. The argument Is that
England's fear that armed conflict far from England might end in defeat led it to introduce opium
into India. Field Study, supra note 19.
218. See Neligan, supra note 5, at 10.
219. For a brief, although by no means full, account of Britain's nineteenth century relations
with Afghanistan see I Encyclopedia Brittanica, Macropaedia, 175-76 (1974).
220. J. Upton, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation 8 (Harv. Middle Eastern
Monograph Ser. 8, 1960).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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also requested and received concessions for building roads and for
developing selected industries. 223
One of these foreign concessions may have had a significant impact
on the spread of drug abuse in the country. In 1862, Nasir ad-Din
Shah granted the British owned Indo-European Telegraph Company
the right to build a telegraph line across the country. While the line
was being constructed, British officers provided opium to their Persian
workers free of charge together with instructions on how to use it.
"Later, they sold opium to the people at five grams for a half a penny
and bought back the smoked residue for five pennies.122 4 It is obvious
that these British officers wanted to make it profitable for the Iranians
to smoke opium, because an opium user received more for the dross
than he paid for the opium.
It was about this time that opium smoking in Iran first appeared on
a wide scale. Iranians had smoked since the seventeenth century when
tobacco was introduced by the Portuguese. 22s Although hashish was
occasionally smoked, opium was not Travellers in seventeenth cen-
tury Iran spoke only of having observed the practice of eating
opium. 226 Opium smoking, a practice popular with the Chinese since
the seventeenth century, began to filter into Iran by the early
nineteenth century via Khorassan Province in the northeast. No one is
sure how it arrived, although some claim that pilgrims to the famous
shrine of Inam Rezah in Meshed were responsible. 22 7 The Iranians
found opium smoking much to their liking. It is possible that this
congenial foreign method of taking opium did much to spur the growth
of addiction in nineteenth century Iran. 228
4. The Persian Character
To anyone who has studied the epidemiology of addiction, it is a
perplexing phenomenon that Iran has a major problem of drug abuse
while neighboring Turkey has, at worst, a negligible drug problem.
Availability of the drug is not a factor since opium has been cultivated
in both countries for at least a century. One study suggests that
Turkish abstinence can be explained by the presence of a "traditional
culture" which succeeds "in creating such a psychological state that the
use of opium is prevented in all but medical instances."22 9 This
explanation only forces the analysis back one step-why has such a
223. Id. at 8-9.
224. Johns, supra note 5, at 32.
225. " Neligan, supra note 5, at 10.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Cf. id. at 30.
229. Akcasu, supra note 34, at 156.
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"traditional culture" developed in Turkey but not in Iran? There are,
however, certain religious and national characteristics that may par-
tially explain why this "traditional culture" developed in one country
and not in the other.
Basically, Islam is divided into two main religious sects-the Sunnis
and the Shias. The Sunnis are predominant in the Arab countries and
in Turkey and Afghanistan, while the Shias predominate in Iran. 230
Although the basic split in Islam grew out of political differences
centering around the succession to the Caliphate, there are different
religious emphases between the sects (apart from national differences
between Arab, Turk and Iranian) that may contribute to greater drug
abuse in Iran. 231 The Sunnis tend to be more orthodox in their
religious outlook; their primary values emphasize rigidity and self
control. The Shias, on the other hand, have a more emotional and
mystical bent to their religion. In addition, the Shias find adaptability
to be a positive value. They are willing to enter into acceptable
compromises with their surroundings, as evidenced by their espousal
of "taqiyah"-a doctrine that permits a Shia to dissolve his faith when
in a hostile environment. 232 This Shiite emphasis on mysticism, pas-
sion and adaptability could more readily lend itself to drug use than
could the Sunni emphasis on rigidity and self-control.
Some indirect support for this hypothesis can be found by analyzing
the incidence of drug abuse among the nomadic tribes of Iran, some of
which are Sunnis and some of which are Shias. The Kurds and
Baluchis, who are Sunnis, 233 are not known to use opium, whereas the
Baktiari and Qashghai, who are Shias, use opium extensively. 234 It
should be emphasized however, that drug abuse even among these
nomadic tribes is not as widespread as in the sedentary population.
There are several reasons for this. Disease was a major factor in
spreading opium use, but the nomadic tribes often had the necessary
mobility to move away from disease before it spread to their ranks.
Studies have shown that the Shahsavan tribe in northwestern Iran
customarily used this tactic to avoid malaria outbreaks. The less they
230. The Shias themselves could be subdassified into three distinct sects. The Ithna
'Ashariya sect is the main Shia sect in Iran. L. Dupree, Afghanistan 101-02 (1973). During the
early centuries of Islam, however, Persia was dominated by the Sunni form of Islam. Nasr,
Ithna 'Ashari Shi 'ism and Iranian Islam, in 2 Islam, Religion in the Middle East 100 (A.J.
Arberry ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Religion in the Middle East].
231. For a general discussion of the Shia-Sunni differences see 9 Encyclopedia Brittanica,
Macropaedia 916-17 (1974). See also A. Guillaume, Islam 88-110, 115-25 (1971).
232. 9 Encyclopedia Brittanica, Macropaedia 917 (1974).
233. Sunderland, Pastoralism, Nomadism and the Social Anthropology of Iran, in I The
Cambridge History of Iran 635, 637 (W.B. Fisher ed. 1968).
234. Field Study, supra note 19. For reference to the Bakhtiari's use of opium see A Brief
Survey of the Principal Tribes of Iran 3 (on file at Fordham Law Review).
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were affected by epidemics, 235 the less they needed opium. Moreover,
in order to survive a tribesman had to be an alert hunter and fighter.
Opium, which dulls the senses, would have undermined these essential
skills. Finally, the tribesman's migratory cycle kept him away from
fixed sources of opium supply. It would be difficult to arrange for
delivery of opium at predetermined points along his migratory route.
Persians consider themselves philosophical and poetical in tempera-
ment and rather self-indulgent in character. 236 One writer summarized
the situation this way: "Few people are given as much to the enjoy-
ment of life's pleasures and beauties as the Persians, but this attitude is
always compensated by the realization that a moment once gone never
returns .... ,,237 The dreamy relaxation produced by opium fits well
with their penchant for introspection and mental and physical serenity.
Early Persian literature is studded with references to the pleasures of
the drug. The poet Firdusi writing in the eleventh century remarked
that opium was a poison in time of war but in time of conviviality "a
world-enlightening moon. '238 Hafiz spoke of the intoxication that
opium and wine can bring. 239 Although the two great Persian physi-
cians, Avicenna and Razi, recognized that prolonged use could cause
addiction, Avicenna himself must have fallen sway to the drug's
seductions since he allegedly died an addict.240 The Turks, on the
other hand, are not overly self-indulgent; rather, they are a moralistic,
well-ordered and disciplined people. Opium smoking, with its ten-
dency toward lethargy and philosophic speculation, would not appeal
to them as it would to the Iranians.
Perhaps as a result of centuries of use, Iranians have not considered
opium to be as dangerous as other drugs such as heroin or hashish. In
a sense, everyone's grandfather smoked opium, and it was common
among the best of Teheran's society for the opium pipe to be circulated
after a good meal or during a party.24 1 It was considered the courteous
and acceptable thing to do-at least among the male guests. Those
who did not wish to indulge usually remained with the ladies. 242
235. See Faghih, Malaria Among the Nomadic Populations, 3 Iranian J. of Pub. Health,
Spring, 1974, at 1, 8.
236. For an interesting essay on Persian psychology see W. Haas, Iran 116-36 (1946).
237. Religion in the Middle East, supra note 230, at 103.
238. Neligan, supra note 5, at 8.
239. Id. at 9.
240. For reference to Razi's and Avicenna's work with opium see Granier-Doyeux, From
Opium to LSD, The Long History of Drugs, 21 UNESCO Courier, May 1968, at 8, 9. See
generally Saba, Detection, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts, U.N.
Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers, Teheran April 5-14, at 1 (1966) (on
file at Fordham Law Review).
241. Kamm, supra note 170, at 44.
242. Id.
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The tea house, chai khaneh as it is called in Farsi, is a social
institution in Iran. In Teheran or other large cities, "[t]raditional tea
houses (Chai Khaneh) are filled with laborers who have recently
migrated from the villages still dressed in their traditional costumes,
drinking tea from small glasses (estekans), playing tric-trac and smok-
ing hubbly-bubblys (qalyan) or crude village pipes. ' 243 In such tea
houses it is customary for news and other information to be discussed.
A second method of news dissemination is the dowreh-a gathering of
twelve to sixteen men who meet on a regular basis to discuss and
debate ideas. 244 The dowreh and chai khaneh provide forums for
social discussion or rumination; the opium pipe adds another social
dimension to the sociality of the gathering. In fact, it has been said
that opium was at one time the source of cohesion for the dowreh. 245
The use of drugs to express group cohesiveness is, of course, not solely
Persian; the same phenomenon can be seen in the United States with
respect to the social use of marijuana.
For these reasons, opium abuse spread in Iran during the nineteenth
century. The confluence of politics, economics and disease, coupled
with basic Persian character traits, created the massive social problem
which still exists today.
C. New Forms of Addiction in Twentieth Century Iran
The reasons for twentieth century heroin and barbiturate abuse in
Iran are less complicated. Heroin did not appear in substantial quan-
tities until the early 1960s. 24 6 Morphine base from Turkey was readily
available and, with the gradual development in Iran of certain indus-
tries (such as the plastics industry), the chemicals needed to transform
the morphine base into heroin were easily obtainable. The chemical
process was understood by a few "heroin chefs," and small primitive
laboratories were set up for domestic production. 247 Although at first
the heroin market was small, there has been a recent increase in the
number of heroin users, who tend to be males between the ages of
twenty and thirty. 248 Availability of barbiturates may have contrib-
243. Miller, Political Organization in Iran: From Dowreh to Political Party, 23 Middle East
J. 159, 160 (1969).
244. Id. at 163-64.
245. Mowlana, supra note 5, at 167.
246. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle East 1971-1972, at
12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/550 E/CN.7/AC.10/1 (1972); Mowlana, supra noteS, at 163-64. But see
R. Payne, Journey to Persia 57 (1951).
247. "The conversion of opium into heroin in so-called 'laboratories' and 'refineries' is no
more complex than making bootleg whiskey in the United States." World Opium Survey,
supra note 48, at 415.
248. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 9; Mowlana, supra note 5, at
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uted to the growth of heroin abuse. Since barbiturates are depressants,
they can be taken in conjunction with heroin or opium to strengthen a
weak supply of the primary drug.2 49 Barbiturates were easily obtain-
able in Iran since they could be purchased from a pharmacy without a
prescription. 25 0 In time, of course, the psychotropic drugs created a
new and separate problem of drug abuse, especially among the West-
ern community stationed in Teheran. American children began exper-
imenting with pills-both uppers and downers-bringing this pecu-
liarly western brand of drug abuse into the midst of Iran's capital. 25' It
is likely that "pill popping" will eventually spread among Iranian
teenagers who slavishly mimic American culture. Historically, Iran has
always needed the help of foreign technicians to develop its resources
and industries. The presence of these large foreign communities,
however, has caused subsidiary problems, such as the introduction of
heroin and barbiturate abuse. This same historical process is continu-
ing today.
IV. IRANIAN DRUG POLICY
Historically Iran has reacted to drug addiction and poppy cultiva-
tion in a variety of ways. 252 In the nineteenth century, the government
encouraged poppy cultivation for the revenues it brought. By the end
of the 1920s, in a moderate policy change, the government curtailed
cultivation and introduced a state monopoly for domestic opium
distribution. Then in 1955, the Shah imposed a total ban on poppy
cultivation and increased penalties in an attempt to end opium use
completely. 253 By 1969, however, the government realized that such a
policy was not feasible and settled on a less drastic but more compli-
cated strategy-limited poppy cultivation in conjunction with a gov-
ernment maintenance program for certain registered addicts, increased
rehabilitation efforts for non-registered addicts and draconian penalties
for drug traffickers. 254
249. McLaughlin, A Nation Tranquilized-A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Abuse of Seda-
tives in the United States, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 725, 741 (1974).
250. Field Study, supra note 19.
251. In 1974, there were approximately 1,800 American junior and senior high school
students in Teheran. Although hashish is the most common drug taken by drug experimenters
in this student population, barbiturate and amphetamine abuse also exists. During 1973-1974,
seven American students were repatriated to the United States because of drug-related
problems. Field Study, supra note 19.
252. For a history of Iran's attempts to curb its drug problem see McLaughlin & Quinn, supra
note 5.
253. Law of Oct. 7, 1955, Concerning Banning the Cultivation of Opium Poppy and Use of
Opium (Iran), U.N. Doc. ENL.195611 (1956).
254. Law of Mar. 4, 1969, Concerning Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium
(Iran), UTN. Doc. E/NL.197QV17 (1970).
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A. The Opium Maintenance Program
As a result of the large number of addicts in Iran during the period
of the opium ban from 1955 to 1969, foreign opium-particularly
Afghan opium-was smuggled into the country to supply their needs.
This smuggling was a political and economic embarrassment to the
Shah. In 1969, the Iranian government decided to divide its addict
population into two groups. One group would be maintained on
government grown opium, while the second group would be forced
into rehabilitation. The membership of each group would be deter-
mined on the basis of an individual's economic productivity. 25 Thus,
addicts over sixty years of age or those under sixty who were too ill or
infirm to undergo withdrawal were permitted to register in the opium
maintenance program on the rationale that by the time someone has
reached sixty or has become incurably addicted, he is basically an
unproductive member of society, and as a consequence, the country
can afford to "legalize" his opium habit.
Acceptance into the government opium program 25 6 requires cer-
tification by a private physician that a person is an addict who is either
too old or too sick to undergo withdrawal. If the addiction is confirmed
by a panel of three doctors from the Ministry of Health, the addict is
issued an identification card valid for six months. The card bears his
photograph, name and address, his daily dosage of opium and the
specific center authorized to distribute his opium. Along with the card,
the addict is issued coupons which must be presented at the distribu-
tion center in exchange for the opium. 257 The opium, however, is not
distributed to the addict free of charge: each gram costs 17.5 rials
255. Iran has a critical shortage of trained manpower. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1974, at 57, col.
5. The 1966 census indicated that seventy percent of Iranians were illiterate, and of the remaining
thirty percent, fifteen percent had not finished elementary education. Only 3.5 percent had
completed secondary education. This educational situation has created a surplus of unskilled
labor and a shortage of skilled labor. International Labour Office, Employment and Income
Policies for Iran 25-26 (1973). Any attempt to increase the productivity of Iranians under sixty
years of age and to discourage their use of opium can succeed only when they are given the
requisite education or training to make them productive members of the Iranian economy. It has
been estimated that the Iranian labor force will increase by 1.5 million during 1973-1977, but the
prospects for a corresponding increase in employment are not favorable. Id. at 23. The Interna-
tional Labour Office, however, has made detailed recommendations to stimulate increased
employment. Id. at 13-19; Law of Sept. 11, 1969, Concerning the Executive Code under Article 3
of the Law Permitting Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium, art. 4 (Iran), U.N. Doc.
E/NL. 1970/19 (1970).
256. The details of the admittance procedure and the method of opium distribution were
described to the author during his field research.
257. These coupons come in different denominations. A five gram coupon is pink, a ten gram
coupon is green and a twenty gram coupon is orange. A skull and cross-bones is printed on each
coupon as a cautionary measure. Field Study, supra note 19.
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(approximately twenty-five cents), although in some areas of the coun-
try the government will sell registered addicts seized Afghan opium at
six rials per gram25 8 (approximately ten cents). If he wishes, an addict
may purchase as much as a thirty day supply of opium at one time. Of
course, if he does so, he must pay the requisite amount of money, hand
in the required number of coupons and have the purchase recorded on
the back of his card. An addict may find this convenient, however,
since he can only obtain his opium from one designated center and
might find it impractical or impossible to come to the designated center
every day for his dosage. When he has exhausted his opium, an addict
need not return the sukhteh, the burned residue, before receiving a
new supply.259 However, his identification card contains a warning
that sukhteh use is illegal.
Generally, designated pharmacies are the authorized opium distribu-
tion centers. There are approximately 300 such pharmacies in the
country. There are sixty-two in Teheran and fourteen in Shiraz. The
pharmacy usually purchases opium in twenty-kilo shipments from the
Opium Trading Company in the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural
Affairs. Each kilo costs 16,900 rials (approximately $250), which must
be paid in advance by the pharmacy. The pharmacy then resells the
opium to the registered addicts for 17,500 rials (approximately $260 a
kilo). Thus, a pharmacy makes a 600 rial profit (approximately $10)
on each kilo of opium sold. One pharmacy in Shiraz260 received four
shipments of twenty kilos in one month, with the result that the
pharmacy made a monthly profit of 48,000 rials (approximately $750)
solely as a distribution center. In return for the license to sell the
opium, a pharmacy must maintain tight security controls, such as
storing the opium in a locked safe, to minimize any possibility of fraud
or theft. All coupons received from the registered addicts must be
stamped as cancelled on a daily basis. The pharmacy must also keep
detailed record books which are audited periodically by the Ministry of
Cooperatives and Rural Affairs. The system of designated distribution
centers seems to function well, although there are reports that some
pharmacies have been burglarized. Additionally, a few pharmacists
have been implicated in illegal drug dealings. 261
As of May 1975, there were approximately 170,000 addicts in the
registered program, an increase of approximately 50,000 from the end
25. Afghan opium is sold mainly in eastern Iran near the Afghanistan border. Iran sells this
contraband opium at a lower price than its own so that the maintenance program's price winl be
competitive with illicit market prices. Id.
259. This was not always the case in Iran. See note 272 infma.
260. While in the city of Shirazi the author visited a pharmacy authorized to distribute
opium.
261. Field Study, supra note 19.
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of 1972. On a nationwide basis, roughly half of the addicts are over
sixty, although the proportion may vary from city to city. March 1975
figures from Shiraz show that, of the approximately 8,000 registered
addicts in the city, over 4,000 are under sixty years of age, with the
majority of these being between forty-six and fifty-five. 262 Such statis-
tics are disturbing in two respects. First, the basic theory of the
maintenance program was that the number of registered addicts would
level off and eventually decrease. Tighter eligibility requirements
would make it more difficult for an addict under sixty to enter the
program; therefore, old addicts would begin to die off at a faster rate
than new addicts would be admitted. This forecast has proven inaccu-
rate, mainly because of lax enforcement of the eligibility requirements.
Reacting to these disturbing statistics, the Ministry of Health has made
administrative changes which should reduce the admission of addicts
to the maintenance program. Although the law still permits automatic
admission to the program only at sixty, as a matter of practice, the age
has been reduced to fifty. 263 Under that age there will be no admission
unless the person is a terminally ill patient.264 Thus, in the forthcom-
ing year-if the Ministry of Health crackdown is effective-there
should be a slowdown in the growth of the program. Addicts in their
forties will not be permitted entrance into the program and, as a
consequence, will be forced into rehabilitation. Theoretically, fewer
persons will be addicts when they reach fifty; consequently, the older
addicts in the program will begin to die off at a faster rate than new
addicts are admitted to the program.
The registered addict program has its critics. 265 Some argue that it is
impossible to condone opium use for some without indirectly condon-
ing it for all. Others argue that the program hampers law enforcement
since a registered addict can in a sense legitimize the presence of opium
no matter where it is found, thereby making police work more difficult.
262. There were 117,643 addicts in the registered program at the close of 1972 and 148,376 at
the close of 1973. Statistics on Narcotic Drugs for 1973, Furnished by Governments in Accor-
dance with the International Treaties and Maximum Levels of Opium Stocks vii, U.N. Doc.
EIINCB/27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Statistics on Narcotic Drugs]. There were 159,149 addicts
in the registered program at the end of 1974. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note I11,
at 7.
263. Field Study, supra note 19.
264. Previously, some addicts were issued a-card if they suffered from diseases such as
asthma or insomnia and used opium to treat them. Id.
265. The advantages and disadvantages of drug maintenance programs is a topic which has
generated much discussion. See, e.g., Barbara & Morrison, If Addiction is Incurable, Why Do We
Try to Cure It? A Comparison of Control Methods in the U.K. and the U.S., 21 Crime &
Delinquency 28 (1975); Chinlund, Urgent Questions About Heroin Maintenance Programs, 37
Fed. Probation 43 (1973); Kaplan, A Primer on Heroin,'27 Stan. L. Rev. 801 (1975); Washington,
Adverse Legal Implications of Heroin Maintenance, 4 N.C. Central L.J. 255 (1973).
[Vol. 44
DRUG POLICY IN IRAN
But the most severe critics claim that the program has been allowed to
degenerate into government support of drug pushing. Of the illegal
opium users interviewed at Vanak Hospital in Teheran, eleven had
received all or part of their daily opium supplies from registered
addicts. 26 6 It is not difficult for a registered addict to sell part of his
legal supply to nonregistered addicts. For example, the daily dosage of
a registered addict may vary from one to twenty grams, with the vast
majority receiving five grams per day. 267 Since opium eaters generally
consume less per day than opium smokers, an addict can register as an
opium smoker and receive a daily dose of five grams when in fact he
may use only two grams. Similarly, an opium smoker can overstate his
daily consumption level. Since there is no precise way to confirm daily
use levels, the Ministry of Health must estimate the requirements of
each addict. Any excess which the addict receives but does not
consume can be sold. Additionally, the government maintenance pro-
gram supplies not only illicit opium, but illicit shireh as well. The
government doles out approximately 180 tons of opium every year to
the 170,000 addicts in the program. 268 Most of this 180 tons is smoked,
thereby creating tons of sukhteh or residue. Since the registered addicts
need not return this dross before receiving new supplies of opium, they
can either reuse it as shireh, thus freeing part of their opium supply for
illegal sale, or sell the dross itself.
269
The government of Iran obviously is aware of this diversion of
opium from registered to nonregistered addicts, but few preventive
measures have been taken. The government's passivity, however, may
be deliberate. First, although diversion from legal channels does
provide addicts with opium, at least it is domestic opium. Before the
government adopted its maintenance program in 1969, large amounts
of Iranian money left the country to pay for smuggled Afghan
opium. 270 The financial drain was a contributing factor in Iran's
266. On June 10, 1975, the author interviewed twenty-five addicts at the Vanak Hospital in
Teheran. The data from these interviews are on file at Fordhaxn Law Review and hereinafter will
be referred to as "Study IL" Each addict was asked eleven questions, the eighth of which read
'Did you ever use government opium received from a registered user?" Because the author could
not speak Farsi, all questions and answers had to be exchanged through an interpreter.
267. Field Study, supra note 19.
268. Obviously this is merely an estimate. The government reported that 169 tons of opium
had been distributed in 1973 when there were 148,376 registered addicts, and that 145 tons had
been distributed in 1972 when there were 117,643 addicts. Statistics on Narcotic Drugs, supra
note 262, at vii. Teheran officials quoted a figure of 180 tons, which is not far out of line with
these earlier figures.
269. See note 272 infra.
270. Field Study, supra note 19. The exact amount of money is, of course, impossible to
estimate. One source claims that it was 800,000,000 rials or $12,000,000 annually. Others would
place it four times higher. See Fact Sheet, Resumption of Opium Poppy Cultivation 3 (1969) (on
file at Fordham Law Review).
1976]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
decision to end the poppy ban in 1969-at least officials so claim. 27 1
Second, the existence of a "gray market" in government opium may
serve certain psychological needs of the registered addict who may
have dealt in opium on a small scale for years and may still need the
feelings of importance and excitement generated by street dealing.
Notwithstanding these two considerations, a laissez-faire attitude to-
wards opium* diversion is still inconsistent with the government's
crackdown on registration of addicts under fifty. While the govern-
ment is preventing these addicts from obtaining drugs directly, it is
permitting them to obtain drugs indirectly. One obvious device that
would limit sukhteh diversion would be to require addicts to return the
dross to the pharmacy before receiving new opium. 272 Although it
might be difficult to determine whether all the residue has been
returned since the amount left in a pipe after smoking will vary, such a
measure would at least ensure the removal of some dross from the
illegal market. Although Iranian government opium has rarely been
seized outside the country, there is the likelihood that it will soon begin
to appear more frequently in the foreign illicit market if large amounts
of opium or sukhteh continue to be diverted from the government
maintenance program. 273
B. Poppy Cultivation and Opium Production
When Iran announced in 1969 that it had decided to reinstitute
modified poppy cultivation, world opinion was strongly critical. 274
Nonetheless, the Iranian decision was not without justification. Even
if Iran had by then become a party to the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs (it became a signatory in 1973), the decision would not
have violated the letter of the treaty which obligates a signatory nation
to prohibit opium cultivation only if the prevailing conditions in the
country render such prohibition the most suitable measure for protect-
ing public health and welfare. 275 Arguably, Afghan and Turkish
smuggling rendered inappropriate an Iranian opium ban. Further-
more, the Convention at least implicitly permits a nation to manufac-
ture opium in sufficient quantity to fulfill domestic medical needs. 27 6
271. See McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 5, at 497-98 & nn.290 & 291.
272. At an earlier time in Iranian history, the preparation of shireh was controlled by the
government, and opium dross was required to be returned to the government. See Neligan, supra
note 5, at 19-20.
273. Field Study, supra note 19.
274. See Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, 22 Bull. Narc., July-Sept. 1970
at 39, 40. See also Kamm, supra note 170, at 44.
275. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, May 15, 1967, art. 22, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S.
No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (effective June 24, 1967).
276. Id. art. 21(1)(a).
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In the eyes of the Iranian government, the maintenance program was a
medical need. However, anticipating the international outcry, and
recognizing that the availability of Turkish and Afghan opium was the
primary reason for ending the ban, Iran added to the legislation
reinstituting poppy cultivation an agreement to impose a new ban once
neighboring countries adopted a similar policy.2 7 7 At the same time,
Iran agreed not to resume the export of opium even though it was one
of seven nations permitted to do so under the terms of a 1953
convention. 278 Instead, and despite pressure from western phar-
maceutical companies, Iran committed its total poppy cultivation for
use in the maintenance program.2 79 In 1974, however, Iran did agree
to export 257,113 kilograms of poppy straw to Yugoslavia.2 80 This sale
may be an isolated transaction stimulated by the acute world shortage
of codeine or it may indicate that Iran presently is rethinking its
nonexport policy.
The government program of opium cultivation and production
seems to be efficient and tightly controlled. Since the poppy can be
planted in the autumn or in the spring, the Ministry of Cooperatives
and Rural Affairs determines twice a year the total poppy acreage
needed28' and then authorizes a farm corporation or a rural coopera-
tive28 2 to grow a specified number of hectares. For example, in the
277. -Law of Mar. 4, 1969, Concerning Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium, art.
1, (Iran) U.N. Doc. EINL.1970117 (1970).
278. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production
of, International and Wholesale Trade In, and Use of Opium, Sept. 14, 1954, art. 6, § 2(a), 14
U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3. The other six countries permitted to export
opium were Bulgaria, Greece, India, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Although this
protocol was terminated and replaced by the Single Convention (at least as between signatory
parties to the Convention), article 24(3) of the Single Convention permits a nation which exported
opium in the ten years prior to January 1, 1961 to continue exporting opium. In a sense, the
Convention protects Iran's right to export, since Iran, under the 1953 protocol, had exported
opium for nine years prior to the Convention. See World Opium Survey, supra note 48, at 412,
Table 2. The United States takes the position that the Single Convention did not replace the 1953
Protocol. Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, The Continued Application of the 1953
Opium Protocol, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 896 (1963).
279. See note 254 supra and accompanying text.
280. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 6.
281. Technically, the Council of Ministers must approve the Ministry's decisions. Law of
May 25, 1969, Concerning the Amendment of the Executive Code under Article I of the Law
Permitting Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium (Iran), U.N. Doc. EINL. 1970118
(1970).
282. By its terms, the law permits growers other than farm corporations and rural cooioera-
tives to receive opium licenses. Id. arts. 2-3, E/NL.1970119 (1970). But as a matter of practice,
only farm corporations and rural cooperatives receive licenses. Report of the Government of Iran,
supra note 111, at 5. For a description of the agricultural organization of Iran see International
Labour Office, Employment and Income Policies for Iran 4046 (1973).
Before the 1955 ban on poppy cultivation, opium was an important product on farms owned by
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autumn of 1974, 16,000 hectares in nineteen provinces or governorates
were used to grow the opium poppy. In the spring of 1975, only 2,500
hectares in nine provinces or governorates were planted. 28 3 Each
licensed plot ranges in size from five to twenty hectares. 2 84 Before a
license is granted, three factors are considered-the capacity of the
ground to grow opium, the number of laborers in the area (poppy
cultivation is labor-intensive) and the visibility of the crop for control
purposes. 28 5 Although receiving an opium license means close supervi-
sion by government officials, licenses are still much sought after: the
opium crop can be sold for a high price, and the poppy requires little
water during its growth cycle, an important consideration in water-
poor Iran. 2
8 6
At harvest time, just after the poppy flowers have fallen, officials
from the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs and the Gen-
darmes come to the plot to supervise the harvest. Lancing takes place
from about one p.m. to four p.m., since the heat of the afternoon
facilitates cutting. Twelve hours later, in the early morning, the
scraping of the latex from the capsule begins. This cycle of lancing and
scraping may be repeated several times in a three week period during
which the government officials remain in constant supervision to
prevent diversion. The opium harvesters are searched each time they
come in from the field to make sure that no opium is secreted on their
persons. 28 7 Once harvested, the latex is turned over to the government
officials who weigh it and give a receipt to the farm manager. When
enough latex has been gathered, it is sealed in twenty-five-kilo contain-
ers and taken by truck to Teheran. The government officials at the site
may accompany the truck to assure themselves that all the opium
reaches its intended destination. Once in Teheran, the raw opium is
brought to a government warehouse where it is weighed a second time
to ensure that none of it has disappeared en route.
Before the latex is processed into prepared opium, excess water must
rich landlords. These landlords allegedly sold a large part of their opium crop to illicit traffickers.
See Davidian, U.N. Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers, Teheran, April
5-14, at 9 (1966) (on file at Fordham Law Review). On the whole subject of land distribution and
sharecropping in Iran see A. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia 318-19 (1953).
283. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 4.
284. Field Study, supra note 19.
285. Id.
286. On the importance of water in Iran see International Labour Office, Employment and
Income Policies for Iran 38 (1973). The Iranian plateau at one time may have been a flourishing
agricultural breadbasket. See Alexander, Ominous Changes in the World's Weather, 89 Fortune,
Feb. 1974, at 90, 152.
287. Field Study, supra note 19.
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be removed from the gum. Raw opium latex may contain anywhere
from twenty-five to sixty percent water. Since the government pays
only for net opium-opium with the moisture removed-the weight of
the net opium must be determined before the farmer can be paid. The
government currently pays the farmer 8,000 rials (approximately $120)
per kilo of net opium. 288
When most of the moisture has been removed, the raw opium is
manipulated into prepared opium at the government warehouse in
Teheran. Large numbers of workmen are needed at this stage of opium
production. Each worker receives three kilos of opium which he moves
back and forth over a board in the sun for seven or eight hours in
continuation of the moisture absorption and drying process. When the
period of manipulation is completed, a second group of workers rolls
the opium into sticks of twenty grams each. Since the morphine
content of Iranian opium may vary depending on the part of the
country from which the opium comes, the government standardizes the
morphine content at about twelve to fourteen percent by mixing weak
and strong opium. 289 Government labels, banderoles made from spe-
cially printed paper, are then attached to the sticks and the opium is
left to dry for two to three months. Once this process is completed, the
opium is ready to be sold to designated pharmacies for distribution to
addicts. Since the government pays the farmer 8,000 rials (approxi-
mately $120) for a kilo of net opium but receives 16,900 rials (approx-
imately $250) a kilo from the distributing pharmacy, a profit is made
on every kilo of opium processed, even after factoring in the costs of
processing the opium and printing the opium banderoles. The profit
earned from opium sales is customarily earmarked for addict rehabili-
tation programs. 290
Generally speaking, few people criticize the government cultivation
program. There seems to be little opium leakage from point of harvest-
ing through point of manufacture. As indicated above, significant
leakage takes place after the sale of opium to the addict.
C. Drug Rehabilitation Program
The second group of addicts in the country-those not permitted
access to the registered maintenance program-are encouraged to seek
treatment. Civil penalties, such as the loss of government employment
288. Review of the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 24 Bull.
Narc., Jan.-Mar. 1972, at 21, 26.
289. The opium harvested in 1974 averaged twelve percent morphine. Report of the Gov-
ernment of Iran, supra note 111, at 5.
290. Field Study, supra note 19.
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if found to be an addict, operate as incentives for addicts to seek
rehabilitative help .291
There is no way to determine the precise number of illegal drug
users in the country. Informed estimates put the number at 350,000 to
400,000 illegal opium users and approximately 30,000 to 50,000 illegal
heroin users.2 92 Recently, two surveys have been completed that
permit a -glimpse at one segment of the illegal drug using community.
In'December 1974, a U.N. drug rehabilitation adviser interviewed 100
addicts at the Vanak Hospital in Teheran293 (Study I). In June 1975, a
more modest survey of twenty-five addicts was conducted at the same
hospital294 (Study II). The Vanak Hospital is primarily a detoxification
center, and until recently was the leading drug "rehabilitation" clinic
in the country.
Study I found that eighty-one percent of those interviewed were
under the age of thirty-five and approximately forty-nine percent were
under thirty. 295 In terms of when these addicts first began to use
drugs, sixty percent of those questioned in Study I said they began
using drugs before they were twenty-five, 296 while in Study II, over
eighty percent said they began using drugs before age twenty-five. 297
Both studies found that some addicts had begun to experiment with
drugs before they were sixteen. As to the addicts' drug preference,
298
sixty-six percent in Study I preferred heroin, 299 while slightly less than
sixty percent preferred heroin in Study ]I.300 Although both studies
encountered sporadic heroin injection, most addicts still preferred to
"chase the dragon" by inhaling the fumes of burning heroin. 30 In-
terestingly, however, both studies found polydrug abuse to be com-
mon, although Study II found a higher incidence of polydrug abuse
291. Law of Sept. 11, 1969, Concerning the Executive Code under Articles 4-7 of the Law
Permitting Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium, art. 2 (Iran), U.N. Doc.
E/NL.1970/19 (1970). Students, if addicted, ultimately can be deprived of their study oppor-
tunities. Id. arts. 11-12. Also, farmers who received land from various government land
distributions can have their lands taken away if they fail to withdraw from their addiction. Law
of Dec. 30, 1968, Concerning Reclamation of the Ceded Lands From Farmers Addicted to
Narcotics (copy on file at Fordham Law Review).
292. Field Study, supra note 19. The higher figure seems more accurate. See Mowlana, supra
note 5, at 164-65; Teheran J., Mar. 9, 1975, at 3, col. 5.
293. Study I, supra note 169.
294. See note 266 supra.
295. Study I, supra note 169, at 3.
296. Id. at Table 2.
297. Study 11, supra note 266, at question 2.
298. Study I, supra note 169, at Table 5; Study I, supra note 266, at question 3.
299. Study I, supra note 169, at 4.
300. Study II, supra note 266, at question 3.
301. Study I, supra note 169, at 4; Study II, supra note 266, at question 4.
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than did Study J.302 Study I also analyzed the addicts' occupations:
twenty-two percent were drivers, fourteen percent were agricultural
workers and ten percent were office workers. 30 3 Of those interviewed
in Study I, twenty-five percent earned from 200 to 400 rials per day
(three to six dollars), eighteen percent from 400 to 500 rials (six to eight
dollars) and twenty percent from 500 to 800 rials30 4 (eight to twelve
dollars). In contrast, nine percent of these addicts spent up to 250 rials
(approximately four dollars) per day on drugs, twenty-one percent
spent from 250 to 500 rials (four to eight dollars), fifteen percent spent
from 500 to 600 rials (eight to nine dollars) and twelve percent spent
from 600 to 700 rials (nine to eleven dollars).30 5 Since earned wages
and expenditures on drugs were almost equal, one might expect that
these addicts supplemented their incomes by crime. 30 6 Study UI, how-
ever, questioned addicts as to their past criminal involvement; com-
paratively few had serious criminal records, 30 7 although some admit-
ted to selling drugs or gambling to make extra money. Some reported,
however, that their family or friends helped them with extra money. 30 8
Until 1974, the Ministry of Health was in charge of drug rehabilita-
tion. In August of that year, drug rehabilitation was turned over to the
newly-created Ministry of Social Welfare. 30 9 Unfortunately, drug re-
habilitation had so stagnated under the Ministry of Health that when
the Ministry of Social Welfare took over, chaos was the order of the
day. Little thought had been given to nationwide planning and coordi-
nation. Drug rehabilitation centers under construction often had not
been completed, and some completed centers had remained vacant for
lack of trained staff. Slowly, however, a semblance of order is return-
ing, and a rough outline of the drug rehabilitation effort is taking
shape.
302. Study I, supra note 169, at Table 6; Study II, supra note 266, at question S.
303. Study I, supra note 169, at Table 3.
304. Id. at Table 4. In 1973, the statutory minimum daily wage was eighty to one hundred
rials (about $1.30). International Labour Office, Employment and Income Policies for Iran 79
(1973). Inflation is quite high in Iran-perhaps as high as twenty percent. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1974, at 57, col. 5.
305. Study I, supra note 169, at Table 8.
306. Although it has been assumed that the need to acquire funds to buy drugs causes
crime, the evidence is by no means conclusive. There may be some correlation between drug
use and acquisitive crime, but there may not be a correlation between drug use and violent
crime. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Drug Usage and
Arrest Charges, A Study of Drug Usage and Arrest Charges Among Arrestees in Six
Metropolitan Areas of the United States 141-86 (1971).
307. Study II, supra note 266, at question 11.
308. Id. at question 7.
309. On August 7, 1974, Imperial assent was given to The Law on Formation of the
Ministry of Social Welfare (copy on file at Fordham Law Review). Article I(f) of that law gave
the Ministry authority to control addict treatment and rehabilitation.
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The thrust of Iran's drug rehabilitation program will center on
so-called community-based mental health centers310 which will not
only treat drug addiction, but also will provide a wide range of
psychiatric and medical services. They will have from thirty to fifty
beds, with additional facilities for out-patient after-care programs.
Initially, an addict will be detoxified and kept in the center for several
weeks as an in-patient. The usual method of detoxification will be via
methadone. 311 After withdrawal, the patient will be returned to the
community on an out-patient basis, supported by after-care help from
the center. In certain cities in Iran, Shiraz for one, there already are
drug programs which function according to this model, providing both
initial detoxification and subsequent after-care. Overall, however, the
decision to treat drug abuse and psychiatric disorders in one clinic will
be a new development in Iran. There are those who criticize this
approach because it will return the addict to his community after only
a few weeks of treatment. Critics maintain that such an approach will
ensure the addict's eventual return to drugs.
The government is also finishing construction of more elaborate long
term drug rehabilitation centers where addicts will be detoxified and
then, over a period of six months, be given occupational training and
after-care help on an in-patient basis. Two of these centers have been
completed: one is in Yaftabad (a suburb of Teheran) and the other is in
Rezaieh. A third center at Kermanshah is in the process of being
completed. 312 Other centers are planned for Mashad, Resht and Sari,
the latter two cities being in the Caspian region where addiction levels
traditionally have been high. 313
Although there are proponents and opponents of both the commu-
nity mental health centers and the large drug rehabilitation centers, the
Ministry of Social Welfare, whether by design or by default, is
310. Field Study, supra note 19.
311. Id. The so-called "anti-opium pill" also has been used as a means of withdrawing
opium users. These pills contain small amounts of opium and tranquilizers. Withdrawal is
effected by gradually reducing the daily dosage of these pills. Some claim, however, that
gastrointestinal bleeding may accompany the use of these pills. Id. One firm in Teheran even
developed a methadone cigar to be used for withdrawal. The methadone is mixed with
menthol to alleviate the methadone's "burning effect." See translation of an advertising
circular of the Tahmassebi & Sons Co. Ltd., Teheran, dated May 20, 1975 (on file at Fordham
Law Review).
312. The author visited both the completed facility at Yaftabad and the uncompleted
facility at Kermanshah: Field Study, supra note 19.
313. The high rate of addiction in the Caspian region may be associated with the age-old
prevalence of malaria in the region. See text accompanying note 184 supra. In the Caspian
province of Gorgon, one expert estimated that ninety to 100 percent of the inhabitants smoked
opium in some fashion or another. H. Azarakhsh, Drug Addiction in Iran 3-4 (copy of speech
on file at Fordham Law Review).
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proceeding with both projects. The first priority of the large centers
will be to rehabilitate young heroin addicts. 314 The community centers
will handle the less serious addiction cases or the overflow from the
larger centers. The community centers will also have to handle all drug
cases in areas where there are no larger centers. Although the govern-
ment's efforts in the rehabilitation field are beginning to take shape,
there are still serious obstacles to be overcome before an acceptable
program is developed.
The principal obstacle to Iran's rehabilitation efforts is lack of
trained manpower.315 There is sufficient money for programs, but
there are few people trained to supervise and administer them. In the
entire country there are less than 150 psychiatrists, the bulk of whom
are in Teheran. 316 Those that do work for the government are usually
not full time employees since most maintain private practices as well.
Trained nurses and social workers are in critically short supply, as are
hospital managers and other administrative personnel. When a hospi-
tal is opened, the trained medical staff are saddled with the additional
burden of administrative responsibilities.
Iran's predilection for use of detoxification as its primary means of
drug treatment is another obstacle to establishing a successful rehabili-
tation program. During the 1950s, Iranian policymakers were con-
vinced that a massive detoxification program could rid the country of
drug abuse. Although thousands were withdrawn in specially desig-
nated facilities, 317 the program was a failure, mainly because there
was no after-care program for the withdrawn addict. 31 8 In a matter of
weeks or months, many patients returned to drugs. Despite this
experience, there seems to be renewed interest in increasing detoxifica-
tion facilities. 319 For example, in the recently opened Yaftabad re-
habilitation center, there is talk of increasing the number of detoxifica-
tion beds and decreasing the number of beds available for long term
after-care. Because of the rapid turnover in detoxification facilities,
statistics can be made to show an impressive "cure rate" at a cost per
addict that is far below comparable figures in long-term rehabilitation
314. Study I, supra note 169, at 5-6.
315. See Power, supra note 177, at 281.
316. Field Study, supra note 19. For reference to the critical shortage of psychiatrists a
few years ago see Power, supra note 177, at 281.
317. See Saba, Detection, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts, U.N.
Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers, Teheran, April 5-14, at 2 (1966).
318. Some argue that detoxification, even when coupled with supportive services, still
results in an alarmingly high recidivism rate. Secretary-General for the first session of the
Comm. on Crime Prevention and Control, New York, May 8-16, 1972, Drug Abuse Criminal-
ity, 25 Bull. Narc., Jan.-M ar. 1973, at 49, 50.
319. Field Study, supra note 19.
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centers. Obviously, if a clinic can detoxify 100 addicts every three
weeks at a cost per addict of $100, it will appear more productive than
a rehabilitation center that treats 100 addicts over a six-month period
at a cost per addict of $1000. But in the end, the success or failure of a
rehabilitation program is not measured by rapid turnover or by
cost-patient ratios, but by the number of patients who are permanently
cured.
A final area of concern is that, as presently constituted, all drug
rehabilitation in Iran is voluntary. 320 There is no legal basis or
provision made for the involuntary commitment of addicts. In many
countries, particularly the United States, addicts convicted of crime
are often sent to rehabilitation programs in lieu of prison.321 Because
such addicts are under judicial custody, they are subject to much
greater control by the rehabilitation center than are persons who
commit themselves voluntarily. Because past recidivism has been so
high in Iran, a program of involuntary commitment might be an
effective weapon for both the courts and the Ministry of Social
Welfare. Cooperative programs between the courts and the Ministry
could provide the courts with a humane method of disposing of some
cases and the Ministry with a pool of patients over whom it could exert
close treatment control.
D. Drug Law Enforcement
1. In General
The third prong of the government's drive to end drug addiction is a
policy of strict law enforcement. In fact, the pressure of law enforce-
ment is critical to the effective working of both the maintenance and
the rehabilitation programs. If the availability of drugs is decreased by
police measures, it is assumed that addicts will be forced into either the
rehabilitation or maintenance programs. On paper at least, the Iranian
government has set up an imposing scheme to intercept and punish
illicit drug smuggling.
320. Id. In Japan, which did not have a compulsory treatment program prior to 1963, the
compulsory nature of its rehabilitation program has been considered a major factor in Japan's
phenomenally successful drug control effort. See Ministry of Health and Welfare-Japan, A
Brief Account of Drug Abuse and Counter-Measures in Japan 10, 12-13 (1972).
321. For a description of such diversion projects in California see Note, Diversion of Drug
Offenders in California, 26 Stap. L. Rev. 923 (1974). The theoretical advantage of court-
ordered diversion is that the drug user is diverted from a system that usually does not alter his
behavior to one that might. Recently, however, the Supreme Court of the United States in
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), held that a state cannot without consent
confine a non-dangerous individual in a mental institution.
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2. Draconian Penalties
The legislation adopted in 1969 by the Iranian Parliament provides
for severe penalties for drug trafficking. A person caught illegally
importing or selling opium, morphine, heroin or cocaine, or illegally
holding or carrying more than two kilograms of opium or ten grams of
morphine, heroin or cocaine is subject to execution.3 22 Possession of
smaller quantities of these drugs is not a capital offense but still merits
a stiff prison sentence. For example, if a person possesses less than two
kilograms but more than fifty grams of opium, or less than ten grams
but more than one gram of morphine, heroin or cocaine, the sentence
is from three to fifteen years at hard labor and a heavy fine. Persons
possessing amounts below these figures may receive sentences of from
one to three years. 323
Capital offenses are tried by military, not civilian, courts. 324 After a
defendant is arrested, the case is referred to a Bazpors, a magistrate
who functions like thejuge d'instruction in the French legal system. 325
The Bazpors investigates the facts of the case and prepares a dossier.
He also renders an opinion as to whether the accused should or should
not be prosecuted. Usually the Bazpors finds sufficient evidence to
proceed and sends the case to the military prosecutor, the Dadsetani
Artash, who prepares a bill of indictment. The case is then tried in the
first level military court, the Dadgah Nezami, which is composed of
three judges and has jurisdiction to execute or to imprison.
As in the French system, the president or chief judge of the court
questions the defendant and any witnesses present. At the close of the
proceeding, the defendant has the right to make a final statement
before judgment is rendered. The accused may have defense counsel,
but the attorney must be either a military lawyer or a retired military
officer.326 If the defendant is found guilty, defense counsel has ten days
to appeal to the Military Court of Review, the Dadgah Tajdid Nazar,
322. Law of June 21, 1969, Concerning the Punishment of Violators of Poppy Cultivation
Laws (Iran), U.N. Doc. E!NL.1970/24 (1970).
323. Id.
324. The materials gathered on the Iranian criminal justice system were the product of
conversations with Iranian lawyers and professors. For a brief description of the legal system
of Iran see Baldwin, The Legal System of Iran, 7 Int'l Law. 492 (1973). For a valuable
bibliography of English language materials on the Iranian legal system see id. at 492 n.3.
325. Since certain aspects of the Iranian legal system are modelled on French sources, id.
at 494-95, 503, articles on French criminal procedures are relevant in this context. See, e.g.,
Freed, Aspects of French Criminal Procedure, 17 La. L. Rev. 730 (1957); Wright, French
Criminal Procedure (pL 1), 44 L.Q. Rev. 324 (1928); Wright, French Criminal Procedure (l.
2), 45 L.Q. Rev. 92 (1929).
326. In United States military practice, a civilian attorney may represent an accused.
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 48a (rev. ed. 1969).
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which is composed of five judges. If this second tribunal upholds the
lower court decision, an appeal can be taken to the highest court in the
land, the Divan-e-alli-Keshvar, only by permission of the Shah, which
is seldom granted. 327
Since the introduction of capital punishment for drug offenses in
1969, military tribunals have sentenced over 200 drug offenders to
death. 328 Newspaper and official reports show, however, that the
military tribunals often mete out stiff prison sentences in lieu of
execution. For example, in 1974, 633 men were tried and convicted by
military courts on drug charges: 329 sixty-two were executed, 181 were
sentenced to life imprisonment and 390 to prison terms of from three to
fifteen years. In 1973, legislation was enacted to permit the execution
of women. In 1974, sixty-nine women were tried and convicted on
drug charges, but all were sentenced to prison terms of from three to
ten years. 330 As of yet, no military court has sentenced a woman to
death for a drug offense. Since capital punishment cannot be imposed
on anyone under eighteen, 331 the seven minors who were brought
before military courts in 1974 were all sentenced to correctional
institutions. 332 In practice, however, when one is tried before a
military court, there is little chance for clemency; usually a stiff
sentence is imposed.
Statistically, however, most drug offenders are tried in nonmilitary
criminal courts. A total of 9,967 dossiers were opened in 1974 as
compared with 14,036 in 1973 and 11,488 in 1972. 33 3 The lowest
nonmilitary court with criminal jurisdiction is the Dadgah Bakhsh.
Until 1973, this court could punish criminal offenders with prison
sentences of up to two months, but in that year legislation was enacted
requiring all prison sentences under sixty-one days to be transmuted
into fines. As a consequence, the Dadgah Bakhsh no longer has
jurisdiction to imprison offenders. Even when the Dadgah Bakhsh
retained jurisdiction to imprison, however, few drug cases appeared
there because drug offenses generally warrant at least a one year prison
sentence.
The next level criminal court is the Dadgah Shahrestan, the criminal
side of which is called the Dadgah Jonheh. This court has jurisdiction
to impose prison sentences of from sixty-one days to three years. The
327. Field Study, supra note 19.
328. Id.
329. See Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 18.
330. Id.
331. See Penal Code of Iran, arts. 34-36, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Technical
Services, Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 15,272 (1962).
332. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 18.
333. Id.
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bulk of misdemeanor drug cases are brought to this court, each case
being tried before a single judge. In Teheran, where the caseload is
particularly heavy, a separate branch of the court has been set up
solely to hear drug cases. 334 Felony drug cases are tried not in the
Dadgah Jonheh, but in the high criminal court-the Dadgah
Ganai-which has jurisdiction over criminal offenses warranting sen-
tences of from two to ten years. In the Dadgah Ganai, three judges sit
on each case.
Criminal procedure in the Dadgah Ganai is quite similar to the
procedure used in the military courts. Within twenty-four hours of
arrest, the defendant is brought before a Bazpors who conducts
whatever investigation is required, including questioning the defen-
dant and any witnesses. At the close of the investigation, the Bazpors
prepares the dossier on the case and recommends that the defendant be
tried or released. The dossier and accompanying recommendation are
then sent to the public prosecutor, the Dadsetan Shahrestan. If the
prosecutor agrees with the recommendation of the Bazpors, the defen-
dant is either indicted or released. If the prosecutor and Bazpors
disagree, the dossier must be sent to a special court, the Dadgah
Ostan, for a judicial determination of whether to indict or to release.
When a case is forwarded to the Dadgah Ganai for trial, the
investigation has been completed. During the hearing, the court ques-
tions relevant witnesses, hears statements from the prosecutor, defense
counsel and defendant and then renders its decision. Trial is by court,
not by jury, since the Iranian Constitution provides for jury trials only
in matters dealing with the press or political affairs.33" If the defendant
cannot afford a lawyer, the court may appoint defense counsel; this
rule is mandatory in felony cases. Plea bargaining as it is known in the
United States is not practiced. An appeal can be taken from the
Dadgah Ganai to the Divan-e-alli-Keshvar. This "supreme court" sits
in twelve panels of three judges each. Appeals are usually heard by
one of the court's twelve panels, 336 although on rare occasions the
court may hear a case en banc.
3. Criminal Accessory Law
Under American law, a conspiracy to commit a crime is itself an
offense separate and distinct from the illegal act which the conspiracy
334. Field Study, supra note 19.
335. Supplementary Constitutional Law of Oct. 8, 1907, art. 79, reprinted in 6 Constitu-
tions of the Countries of the World 23 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1971) (Iran's
Constitution edited by A. Sedehi).
336. There is no oral argument before this court; cases are submitted on the appropriate
papers. Powers, supra note 177, at 284.
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has been formed to commit. 337 Thus, if A and B agree to smuggle
drugs into the United States and then commit some overt act in
furtherance of that agreement, they can be prosecuted for the crime of
conspiracy whether or not the drugs were actually smuggled into the
country. On the other hand, if A and B agree to smuggle drugs and
succeed in doing so, they can be prosecuted for both the crime of
smuggling and for the crime of conspiracy. 338 Although in certain
situations the Penal Code of Iran makes conspiracy or intent to commit
a crime a separate offense, 339 there is no general provision making all
such conspiracies distinct offenses. But, in situations where a crime
has in fact been committed, articles 28 and 29 of the Iranian Penal
Code provide that anyone who instigates or aids in the commission of a
crime as an accessory to that crime is punishable as a principal. 340 To
be more precise, article 28 designates as an accessory: a) a person who
instigates a crime if the crime took place as a result of the instigation;
b) a person who agrees to commit a crime if the crime took place as a
result of the agreement, and; c) a person who knowingly helps the
perpetrator of a crime either by supplying the means for committing
the crime or by facilitating the commission of the crime in any way. 3 4 1
Thus, if drug smuggling or some other drug-related crime has taken
place, anyone who can be tied to that crime either by agreement,
facilitation or instigation can be convicted under articles 28 and 29.
The scope of the provisions is sufficiently broad to include high echelon
drug entrepreneurs who mastermind drug syndicates without ever
actually handling the drugs themselves. If convicted, they will be
subject to the same severe punishment as those who actually commit-
ted the criminal acts. Unlike a conspiracy statute, however, articles 28
and 29 cannot be used where the police can prove an agreement to
smuggle drugs but cannot prove that the smuggling actually took
place.
There is also a curious uncodified practice in Iran of removing a
person from a particular jurisdiction for a set period of time on the
ground that the individual is a threat to internal security. 342 The
decision to "exile," made by a committee composed of the Governor
General of the Province, the National Police and the Public Pros-
ecutor, is not a punishment for crime because the person has not been
337. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 61, At 494 (1972); e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846
(1970).
338. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
339. Penal Code of Iran, art. 72, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Technical Services,
Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 15,272 (1962).
340. Id. art. 29.
341. Id. art. 28.
342. Field Study, supra note 19.
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formally charged or convicted of anything. 34 3 Rather, it is a means of
temporarily removing certain dangerous individuals from a particular
area by extra-judicial means. Five alleged smugglers have reportedly
been sent out of Teheran pursuant to this internal security proce-
dure. 344
4. Police and Drug Enforcement Personnel
In Iran, two departments-the National Police and the Imperial
Iranian Gendarmerie-have primary responsibility for law enforce-
ment.3' 5 The National Police, which has jurisdiction in cities with a
population in excess of 5,000 persons, has a complement of approxi-
mately 40,000 officers and men divided into forty-five units. One of
these units is the Narcotics Bureau which in the city of Teheran is
composed of approximately eighty men. Not all eighty, however, can
be classified as investigative officers. Some are administrative staff and
support personnel. The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie, which has
jurisdiction over the borders as well as towns with less than 5,000
people, has a complement of approximately 72,500 men. The anti-
smuggling division is composed of a central staff of sixteen and over
100 eighteen-man squads spread throughout the country. A third force,
the Customs Administration, has limited narcotics jurisdiction at bor-
der posts and airports.
Both the National Police and the gendarmes possess modern
equipment and have been schooled in the most advanced techniques of
narcotics law enforcement. Many of the senior officers in the anti-
smuggling division of the Gendarmerie received some training in the
United States. 346 An American narcotics adviser has also been as-
signed to Gendarmerie headquarters. 347 Gendarmerie officers regularly
participate in United Nations drug training seminars, and some have
received U.N. fellowships to study abroad. The equipment available
to the gendarmes varies according to the border in question. On the
Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, for instance, the gendarmes
operate about thirty 31-foot inboard boats and approximately thirty 20-
foot combined inboard-outboard craft.348 An additional twenty 50-foot
343. See Penal Code of Iran, arts. 8, 12, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Technical
Services, Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS 15,272 (1962), where exile is listed as an
acceptable penalty for crime. The duration of this exile shall not be less than three years nor
more than 15 years. Id. art. 12.
344. Field Study, supra note 19.
345. See McLaughlin & Quinn, supra note 5, at 509-13.
346. Field Study, supra note 19.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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gunboats are being purchased. Since the Persian Gulf border stretches
1,800 kilometers from Iraq on the west to Pakistan on the east, this
gendarme force is supplemented by regular units of the Iranian Navy
which operate in the area. 349 To patrol the land borders, the gen-
darmes operate some light aircraft, approximately eight large Huey
helicopters and a number of small6r helicopters. 350 In addition, the
gendarmes have purchased one hundred Yamaha motorcycles for
patrol work and supplement that number by reimbursing individual
gendarmes who use their own motor vehicles. 351 The gendarmes also
have been outfitted with ninety night vision devices with an effective
range of 600 meters. 35 2
Like the gendarmes, National Police officers have studied in the
United States and have received supplemental training from the
United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs. 353 Two American Drug
Enforcement Administration agents are stationed in Teheran and are
available to assist the police Narcotics Bureau. The National Police
have access to electronic eavesdropping equipment and a narcotics
laboratory. Additionally, they have developed an informer system. 354
"Buy" money for undercover drug purchases is available. In Teheran
the commander of the Narcotics Bureau can personally authorize an
undercover buy of up to 50,000 rials (approximately $770).3 5- The
public prosecutor can empower the police to open and read letters or
telegrams; any evidence so obtained may be introduced at trial.
Efforts to turn the gendarmes and the National Police into effective
narcotics control agencies were not limited to increased training and
equipment; both agencies also work under a generous financial incen-
tive system. Depending on the type and quantity of drugs seized and
the circumstances of the arrest, a gendarme or police officer will
receive a monetary reward. For example, if a kilo of heroin is seized
and an armed smuggler is arrested, the men making the arrest and
349. The Iranian Navy presently operates two large bases on the Persian Gulf, one at
Bushire and the other at Bandar Abbas. A third base is under construction at Chahbahar on
the Strait of Hormuz. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1975, at 13, col. 1.
350. Field Study, supra note 19.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. For reference to foreign and U.N. training of the police see Seyrafi, Investigation
Techniques in Respect of Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, and Techniques of Counter-
Measures, U.N. Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers, Teheran, April 5-14,
at 2 (1966).
354. Field Study, supra note 19. For reference to informers see Studies of Illicit Traffic
Cases, U.N. Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers, Teheran, April 5-14, at
2-3 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Studies of Illicit Traffic Cases].
355. Field Study, supra note 19. For reference to one Narcotics Bureau "buy" in Teheran
see Studies of Illicit Traffic Cases, supra note 354, at 3-5.
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seizure will be paid 150,000 rials (approximately $2,300). If the arrest
was a planned operation but the smugglers were unarmed, the reward
would be 105,000 rials (approximately $1,600) for the first kilo of
heroin. An accidental seizure of a kilo of heroin would bring only
60,000 rials (approximately $1,000). The rewards paid for opium,
morphine and shireh are substantial but less generous than those paid
for heroin. 35
6
From this brief sketch it would appear that the National Police and
Gendarmerie are well trained and equipped and operate under a law
adequate to meet their needs. But on closer inspection, various disturb-
ing signs appear.
5. Weaknesses of the Drug Enforcement System
a. Lack of Cooperation
In recent months, cooperation between Iran and regional and inter-
national law enforcement agencies seems to have diminished. 3 7 For
example, although Iran is a member of ICPO/Interpol, little drug
intelligence information seems to originate from the country. 3S8 Often,
information obtained by Iranian officials is not shared with Interpol, or
with other nations in the area, or even with regional organizations
such as the U.N. Subcommission on Illicit Traffic, CENTO or the
Colombo Plan Bureau. 35 9 In regard to its financial support of interna-
tional law enforcement efforts, Iran has made only minimal contribu-
tions to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, 360 and
recently refused to renew a U.N. drug adviser's contract.36'
This lack of cooperation evidenced on the international level also
exists at the national level. Law enforcement agencies and ministries
responsible for implementing Iran's drug programs do not appear to
356. See Narcotic Reward Schedule (on file at Fordham Law Review).
357. This appears to be the case, despite various constructive proposals by the govern-
ment of Iran for increasing cooperation. See First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note
58, §§ 35-36, at 12-13.
358. Field Study, supra note 19. See First Report of the Sub-Commission, supra note 58,
§ 41, at 14-15. But see id. §§ 35-36, at 12-13. In one reported instance, Interpol may not have
followed up on intelligence supplied by the Iranians. See Studies of llicit Traffic Cases, supra
note 354, at 6.
359. Field Study, supra note 19.
360. As of July 1975, Iran had contributed to the U.N. Fund a total of $15,000 in three
$5,000 installments pledged on October 18, 1971, December 31, 1973 and May 31, 1974.
$15,000 seems a particulary small contribution, not only in terms of the billions of dollars Iran
has received in oil revenues during the past few years, but also in terms of the size of Iran's
own drag problem. The size of this contribution may be attributable to the fact that many
Iranian officials are piqued at the steady flood of financial requests inundating the government.
Field Study, supra note 19.
361. Id.
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communicate with each other or to coordinate their operations. In
1974, the government of Iran announced that a ministerial committee
was being formed to oversee all phases of the country's drug policies.
The stated objectives of the committee were to intensify law enforce-
ment efforts, to provide more extensive and effective means for
treating drug addicts and to create a suitable educational program to
counter drug abuse. 362 The ministerial committee was to be composed
of the Ministers of Health, Social Welfare, Education, Information,
Science and Higher Education and the Commanding Generals of the
Gendarmerie and. National Police. Although a potentially powerful
and much needed institution, little has been heard of the committee
since its formation. Indeed, there are no reports that the committee has
ever met. A Secretariat has not been set up, nor are there any signs of
an administrative or operational structure. 363 As a consequence, de-
spite the rhetoric, the necessary internal coordination between law
enforcement agencies and the other ministries is still not a reality.
Even among law enforcement agencies themselves, there seems to be
little interagency cooperation. Both officially and practically, the Na-
tional Police and the Gendarmerie operate separately and indepen-
dently, despite public pronouncements of close interagency coopera-
tion. Perhaps the reward system militates against cooperation. A police
officer might well refrain from sharing intelligence information with a
gendarme officer if such cooperation could result in having to share the
reward for the arrest.
b. Ineffective Prosecution of High-level Drug Traffickers
An indication that police enforcement of the drug laws is not
completely effective is that few high-level drug traffickers are arrested
and convicted. In order to smuggle large quantities of hashish from
Afghanistan to Europe, some tightly knit organization must exist.
Police in Germany report that they know of at least ten Iranian and
fifteen Turkish drug smuggling networks bringing drugs into Ger-
many. 364 Iranian law enforcement officials admit that they possess
similar information, but newspaper accounts indicate that those exe-
362. For a more comprehensive list of this Committee's objectives see Azarakhsh, Iran:
Epidemiology of Drug Use in the Regional Countries, in CENTO Seminar, supra note 34, at
45. The use of a committee in Iran may have special significance. A committee can be used to
disperse and confuse responsibility instead of fostering it; it can become a means of individual
self protection. See J. Upton, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation 29-30 (Harv.
Middle Eastern Monograph Ser. 8, 1960).
363. Field Study, supra note 19.
364. Id.
[Vol. 44
DRUG POLICY IN IRAN
cuted over the past four years tended to be persons caught in actual
possession of drugs. 365 There is only scant reference to convictions of
important financiers or high-level importers, which is puzzling when
one remembers that Iran's criminal accessory law provides the basis
for such high-level arrests. One explanation might be that the reward
system tends to discourage the arrest of top-ranking drug dealers. A
police officer receives his reward only if he physically seizes drugs, and
the size of the reward depends upon the quantity seized. An arrest of a
high level financier who usually would not see, let alone handle, drugs
merits no reward.
c. Inadequate Manpower
In terms of the manpower allotted to drug enforcement, the gov-
ernment of Iran does not show an overly strong commitment. The
National Police Narcotics Bureau in Teheran is woefully understaffed
for a city of almost four million people. There are only two agents in
each of the city's twenty-two precincts. Although there is also a central
unit of eighty men,366 only half of these are trained drug agents. In a
similar vein, gendarme anti-smuggling units do not operate full time;
regional commanders use them at will for purposes other than those for
which they were specifically designed.
d. Procedural Difficulties
Despite adequate training and equipment, the National Police and
Gendarmerie are hampered by rigid internal controls that impede
effective police work. For example, before meeting with an informer, a
police officer must obtain permission from his superior officer, who
must then be kept abreast of every detail. If "buy" money is lost during
an investigation, the police officer who loses it may be liable for
repayment. Financial liability is also placed on gendarmes who dam-
age equipment in the line of duty.367 As a consequence, a police officer
is loath to take any risks with "buy" money and a gendarme would
prefer to leave the equipment in its crate. To make matters worse,
standard patrol equipment, such as motorcycles and helicopters, often
365. This conclusion was based not only on newspaper reports, but also on two earlier
reports presented at the 1966 U.N. Seminar on Narcotics Control for Enforcement Officers
held in Teheran. The smugglers who were arrested could be termed important, but clearly
were not high-level organizers. For a list of such high-level organizers in Turkey see The
Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 34-38.
366. Field Study, supra note 19.
367. Id.
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is not used for its intended purposes. For example, on the Afghan
border helicopters are unable to fly during most of the day because of
strong wind currents. Yamaha motorcycles allegedly purchased for
border patrol are used for messenger transport in Teheran. Perhaps
due to such circumstances, drug seizures declined in 1974. In that year
9,848 kilograms of opium were seized, down from 20,432 kilograms in
1973. Comparative figures for morphine, heroin and hashish seizures
show the same decrease. In 1974, three kilograms of morphine were
seized, down from 104 kilograms in 1973; 83.6 kilograms of heroin
were seized, down from ninety-four kilos in 1973 and 2,583 kilograms
of hashish were seized, down from 5,054 kilograms in 1973.368
e. Corruption
Finally, there are persistent rumors of corruption in government and
law enforcement agencies. 369 For example, there are those in Afghanis-
tan who consider Iranian border police eminently bribable. Large
seizures of drugs are occasionally reported without any mention of
arrests, thereby leading the more cynical to speculate on the existence
of a payoff. Official corruption is not uncommon in the United States,
and it is not surprising that it exists abroad. 370 It is generally recog-
nized that kickbacks are a way of life in all the Middle East as well as
Iran. 37 1 One early commentator concluded: "Indeed, so far is pecula-
tion from being regarded as disgraceful, that a man who does not
make use of his opportunities is considered not only a fool, but with
suspicion, as one who is a potential spy, and at any rate an inconveni-
ence to be got rid of at the first favorable opportunity. '372 It would be
unusual if centuries-old customs were to disappear overnight.
368. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 13.
369. See, e.g., Mowlana, supra note 5, at 171; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1975, at 53, col. 3.
Official corruption is subject to severe penalties in Iran. See Penal Code of Iran, arts. 139-47,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Joint Publications Research Service,
JPRS 15,272 (1962).
370. Referring to those drug agencies which antedate the old Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, former Attorney General John Mitchell remarked: "There was considemble
lack of integrity on the part of many of the agents of predecessor organizations .... Some of
them have been indicted. Others have had administrative procedures instituted against them
. . . ." P. Goldberg & J. DeLong, Federal Expenditures on Drug-Abuse Control, in The Drug
Abuse Survey Project, Dealing with Drug Abuse: A Report to the Ford Foundation 308
(1972). See also Brecher, supra note 180, at 93.
371. See The Heroin Trail, supra note 30, at 20-23; J. Upton, The History of Modern Iran:
An Interpretation 23-24 (Harv. Middle Eastern Monograph Ser. 8, 1960).
372. See J. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia 66 (1922), quoted in J. Upton, The
History of Modem Iran: An Interpretation 139 n. 11 (Harv. Middle Eastern Monograph Ser. 8,
1960).
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f. Conclusion
Although some of the problems discussed above may take decades to
resolve, others, such as the revitalization of the ministerial committee,
could be settled almost overnight. The fact that such steps are not
being taken shows a complacency on the part of the government of
Iran which is particularly unjustified at a time when there are ominous
signs that drug addiction is on the increase. In the past two years, both
the maintenance program and the estimated number of nonregistered
addicts have continued to grow. Heroin from Afghanistan 373 has
appeared in Iran, and hashish oil, a potentially disastrous hallucinogen,
also has been seized in the country.374 At the same time, increased
urban industrialization is likely to exacerbate the narcotics problem.
6. The TIR Problem
Before proceeding to a discussion of drug research in Iran, mention
should be made of the so-called "TIR" problem. In order to facilitate
the movement of goods across international boundaries, the Economic
Commission for Europe drafted a Customs Convention on the Interna-
tional Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets. 375 A signa-
tory nation must permit trucks with special TIR carnets to pass through
its customs checkpoints without examination. As a condition of this
free passage, however, the cargo must be examined and sealed by
customs authorities in the country of origin. Presently twenty-eight
countries belonging to the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
have become contracting parties to the TIR Convention. Five non-
ECE countries, including Iran, have also signed the convention. 376
Consequently, an Iranian truck carrying goods under cover of a TIR
carnet may pass without customs search from Iran to destination
points as far away as the United Kingdom or Norway. The drug
smuggling possibilities inherent in such a system are obvious.
Although resolutions have been adopted by the ECE urging nations
373. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
374. Report of the Government of Iran, supra note 111, at 16-17.
375. Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR
Carnets (TIR Convention) and Protocol of Signature, done Jan. 15, 1959, 20 U.S.T. A84,
T.LA-S. No. 6633, 348 U.N.T.S. 13. A revised text of the Convention is presently under
consideration. TIR is an abbreviation for the French words "Transport International
Routiers."
376. Iran became a signatory to the Convention on May 25, 1971. Field Study, supra note
19.
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to give immediate attention to TIR drug smuggling, 377 there appears
to be divergence of opinion as to what should be done. The United
Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs takes the position that more
stringent measures are required, particularly in light of the burgeoning
amount of TIR traffic. In Iran alone, at least 250 trucks are authorized
to use Iranian TIR carnets, and the number is expected to continue to
grow. 378 The ECE, on the other hand, claims that drug smuggling is
rare and normally occurs, not in the sealed cargo, but in secret traps
built into the bodies of the transporting vehicles-areas not protected
from search by the TIR convention.
The ECE, in balancing the need for quick transport of goods against
the harm caused by a limited amount of drug smuggling, seems to
favor the rapid transport of goods. Although overall statistics on TIR
drug seizures are unavailable, 379 two Iranian TIR trucks have been
intercepted while carrying drugs, and there are unofficial speculations
that an extensive search of all TIR trucks coming from the Near East
would probably reveal many more trucks carrying drugs, particularly
hashish. 380
Any solution to the problem will require extensive international
cooperation. Under the convention, it is possible for a TIR cargo to be
examined. Customs authorities of a particular country may "in excep-
tional cases and particularly when irregularity is suspected" carry out a
summary or full examination of the transported goods. 38' A search is
customarily made when the seal on the truck appears to have been
broken or tampered with. It would seem, however, that more frequent
searches must be made if TIR drug smuggling is to be deterred. To
begin with, changes in the Convention language could be adopted to
permit random searches of trucks in non-exceptional cases even when
irregularity is not suspected. Cooperative mechanisms would have to
be worked out between TIR nations to maximize inspections while
minimizing delays. The use of trained dogs is a quick and efficient way
to perform random searches. 382 Perhaps mobile units equipped with
377. Inland Transport Comm., Economic Comm'n For Europe, Res. 220, Annex 1, U.N.
Doc. ECErRANS/8 (1974).
378. Field Study, supra note 19.
379. See Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, supra note 50, at 55, for four recent reported
cases of smuggling in TIR trucks.
380. Field Study, supra note 19.
381. Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR
Carnets (TIR Convention) and Protocol of Signature, done Jan. 15, 1959, art. 4, at 4, 20 U.S.T.
184, T.I.A.S. No. 6633, 384 U.N.T.S. 13.
382. Concerning the effectiveness of dogs in sensing drugs see M. Harney & J. Cross, The
Narcotics Officer's Notebook 296-305 (2d ed. 1973). Of course, to be effective, the animal
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dogs or with drug sensing devices could make random searches at
various points along international highways. Companies whose
trucks383 are found to contain drugs should not only be heavily
penalized but also should be denied the privilege of using TIR carnets.
Similarly, a system of time checks and stipulated itineraries should
be rigidly enforced. If, for example, a TIR truck crosses the Iranian-
Turkish border, it should be expected to use certain highways and
reach the next border crossing in Bulgaria by a certain time. Any
unexplained or unreasonable delay should serve as grounds for a
search. Presently the Convention permits but does not require a
country to institute time limits and stipulated itineraries for trucks
carrying TIR cargo. 38 4 Trucks should also be inspected more fre-
quently than every two years; the added cost of more frequent inspec-
tions could be passed on to the trucking companies. 385 Inspections, like
cargo searches, should be made on a random basis whenever possible.
Additionally, companies should be forced to administer drug
urinanalysis tests regularly to their drivers. Finally, companies should
rotate drivers' destinations to prevent them from developing repetitive
travel patterns.
E. Drug Education and Research
Although Iran has at least the rudiments of a drug rehabilitation
effort, it has virtually no drug education program. 8 6 Some Iranian
officials argue that drug education is counter-productive since the very
mention of drugs arouses a person's curiosity to try them.3 8 7 The little
"drug education" that does exist is of the "scare-tactics" variety; for
example, a poster warns of the dangers of drug abuse by showing a
man strangling on his opium pipe. But, in 1974, there was an apparent
change in emphasis, at least at high policy levels. 388 For the first time
there was talk of a broad-based, multi-media attempt to educate
must be trained and handled properly. Cultural differences in the treatment of animals can
affect the animal's performance. Iranians have a tendency to abuse animals. Power, supra
note 177, at 289. Thus, dogs may not be an effective anti-smuggling weapon in Iran.
383. In some countries, smugglers allegedly own fleets of TIR trucks. See The Heroin
Trail, supra note 30, at 38.
384. Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR
Camets (TIR Convention) and Protocol of Signature, done Jan. 15, 1959, art. 10, at 7, 20 U.S.T.
184, T.I.A.S. No. 6633, 348 U.N.T.S. 13.
385. Currently, TIR road vehicles must be inspected every two years. Id. Annex 4.
386. See Mowlana, supra note 5, at 173.
387. Field Study, supra note 19.
388. Teheran J., July 15, 1974, at 4, col. 1.
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people to the dangers of drug abuse. The official talk produced a flurry
of activity. One year later, however, there are few signs of an existing
program, and there is no one in the government with the apparent
responsibility for running such a program. Even at the University of
Teheran where there are drug counselling programs for students, there
is little academic discussion of a nationwide drug education program.
Although there is no systematic and broad-based effort to study the
causes or effects of addiction, there are a few on-going research
projects which might have an impact on drug policy in Iran and
perhaps other countries as well. At the Vanak Clinic, doctors are
analyzing the relative effectiveness of various methods of treating
ex-opium addicts. 389 There are approximately 100 patients in the
study, all of whom are eighteen to fifty year old men who use heroin,
opium or shireh. No subject will be accepted into the study if he has a
criminal record (narcotic offenses are excluded, however) or a serious
organic illness. Treatment consists of giving the methadone, mutabon
or a placebo in a double-blind situation in which neither the doctor nor
the patient knows which drug is being administered. Hopefully when
the study is completed, doctors will be able to assess the merits of
treating ex-opium addicts with methadone or mutabon.
Under sponsorship of the World Health Organization, the Ministry
of Health is studying the impact of the registered addict program on
the social habits and family life of addicts. 390 Three hundred subjects
have been selected for the project. During the course of the study, each
will be interviewed three times at six-month intervals. Similar studies
have already been completed on methadone maintenance in the United
States391 and heroin maintenance in the United Kingdom. When
completed, these three studies should give drug experts a better picture
of the life and habits of addicts after they become members of a
government maintenance program.
Perhaps the most significant research being conducted in Iran cen-
ters on the so-called "black poppy"-papaver bracteatum. This poppy
has an extremely high thebaine content (from which codeine and
naloxone can be made), but contains no morphine. 392 If it can be
389. Field Study, supra note 19.
390. For reference to this study see Azarakhsh, Iran, Epidemiology of Drug Use in the
Regional Countries, in CENTO Seminar, supra note 34, at 44.
391. The study on methadone maintenance in the United States is S. Wilmarth & A.
Goldstein, Therapeutic Effectiveness of Methadone Maintenance Programs in the USA (WHO
Geneva 1974).
392. See Sharghi, On the Existence of Large Quantities of Thebaine in Iran's Black
Poppy, in Ramin, Jan. 1972 (an Iranian pharmaceutical and scientific monthly on file at
Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Sharghi]. The seeds of papaver bracteatum also
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grown commercially, 3 93 papaver bracteatum could replace papaver
somniferum as the basic poppy from which codeine is derived, thereby
eliminating the possibility of opium diversion to illegal heroin
traffickers. Presently, however, research efforts aimed at transforming
the black poppy, a wild plant, into a domestic crop are at an early
stage. 39
4
The papaver bracteatum experiments are not without their critics. It
is known, for example, that several derivative compounds of
thebaine-the so-called Bentley compounds-are extremely potent. 3 95
One of these compounds-etorphine (M99)-is 10,000 times stronger
than morphine. 3 96 Because of this potency, individual doses must be
measured in micrograms. Presently, etorphine is used only to anes-
thetize wild animals, 397 but some fear that, in time, it could become a
contain a high percentage of vegetable oil which may have many uses. See Kayhan Int'l, Mar.
19, 1974, at 4, col. 5, 8. More research is needed to determine whether this seed oil is fit for
human or animal consumption. Secretariat, Division of Narcotic Drugs, Scientific Research on
Papaver Bracteatum, U.N. Doc. ST/SOAISer.J./15 (1974).
393. The French are already growing papaver bracteatum experimentally in the hope of
developing it as an alternate source of codeine. In 1973, the French produced 1,000 kilograms
of codeine from papaver bracteatum. Committee on Problems of Drug Dependence, National
Research Council, Study of Synthetic Substitutes for Opiate Alkaloids 48 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Study of Synthetic Substitutes]. Papaver bracteatum has one agricultural advantage
over the opium poppy, papaver somniferum, in that papaver bracteatum is a perennial plant,
not requiring yearly seeding, while papaver somniferum must be planted each year. See
Extract from a Letter from the General Accounting Office to Representative Rangel, Nov. 21,
1974, on file at Fordham Law Review. The best thebaine levels in papaver bracteatum are
reached two or three years after planting. Id.
394. See Wall St. J., Nov. 14, 1974, at 38, col. 1. Initial research at the University of
Teheran centered on one variety of papaver bracteatum, Arya I, which grows in the Alborz
mountains north of Teheran at altitudes of 1,600 to 2,300 meters. See Sharghi, supra note 392,
at 2. Recently, a second bracteatum variety called Arya I was discovered in Kurdistan. See
Secretariat, Division of Narcotic Drugs, Scientific Research on Papaver Bracteatum, U.N.
Doc. ST/SOAISer. J./15, at 23 n.13 (1974). Arya I has only one dominant alkaloid, thebaine
(see id.), while Arya I has thebaine combined with another significant alkaloid, alpinigenine.
Since Arya I1 would return higher thebaine yields than Arya I, it is more desirable for possible
commercial cultivation. Iran has promised to share Arya I seeds with United Nations
countries wishing to cultivate the plant on an experimental basis. During 1974, the Arya I
variety of papaver bracteatum was cultivated experimentally in Australia, France, Hungary,
Israel, Japan, Norway, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Germany and Yugo-
slavia, id. at 22, and has been reported also growing in Iraq, Turkey and Russia, id. at 1 10.
Iran gave the seeds for these plantings to the United Nations Narcotics Laboratory in Geneva
which in turn distributed them to the various nations.
395. See Bentley & Hardy, New Potent Analgesics in the Morphine Series, 16 Proceedings
of the Chemical Soc'y 220 (1964); Lister, Letter to the Editor, 16 J. Pharm. Pharmacol. 364
(1964).
396. Study of Synthetic Substitutes, supra note 393, at 90.
397. Id.
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more lethal drug of abuse than heroin. This fear is by no means
groundless. First, the chemical process for converting thebaine into
etorphine is readily available. 398 Although this process involves some
risk to the chemist, a well-equipped and careful individual could
readily produce large quantities of etorphine. Second, once produced,
extremely small quantities could supply thousands of addicts, facilitat-
ing illegal transport and distribution. Third, the drug itself is highly
addictive and an overdose of only a few micrograms could result in
death. 399 Thus, before thebaine becomes too available, the relative
dangers of these Bentley compounds should be studied further. Too
often medicine lauds a new drug cure, only to later discover that the
cure is worse than the disease.
V. AN EVALUATION OF IRAN'S DRUG CONTROL PROCEDURES
The government of Iran has inaugurated extensive programs aimed
at the eradication of drug abuse. On paper at least, these programs
represent a balanced approach to the problem, emphasizing law en-
forcement, rehabilitation and limited opium maintenance. Because the
programs are interdependent, however, the failure of one will en-
danger the success of the other two. Unfortunately, operational
difficulties have begun to upset the balance. Since strict law enforce-
ment was the linchpin of the entire drug strategy, the difficulties which
have surfaced in this area are perhaps the most important.
In theory, harsh measures aimed at drug traffickers were intended to
prevent importation of opium from Turkey, Afghanistan and, to a
lesser extent, Pakistan. With the supply of illicit drugs reduced,
economic forces would increase drug prices, and the average Iranian
addict would not be able to afford opium. Without the wherewithal to
support his habit, the addict would be forced into rehabilitation or, if
he were eligible, into the maintenance program. In the view of
government policy makers, either alternative was acceptable because
both had the effect of drying up the market for smuggled opium.
Harsh law enforcement measures did reduce opium smuggling but not
to the point of making opium prices prohibitive. There are many
reasons why the law enforcement agencies failed. First, the Afghan
398. The process is patented in Belgium and Great Britain. See generally The Merck Index
444 (8th ed. 1968).
399. Study of Synthetic Substitutes, supra note 393, at 90. 0.3 kilograms of M-99 Is
equivalent to approximately 1,000 kilograms of heroin. Id. at 36. In this context, some experts
argue that the high potency of these compounds makes them unattractive to addicts. Apart
from the risk of fatal overdose, the compounds tend to knock out an addict instead of
providing the desired high. Field Study, supra note 19.
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border was all but unpatrollable,400 and smugglers adapted their
tactics to take advantage of the terrain and the climate. Second, the
Afghans could not field an effective border force to intercept smugglers
before they crossed the borders. Third, the Iranians themselves
adopted a rather passive stance towards high level drug dealers. In
business terminology, a drug smuggling network might be typed as a
vertically integrated, loose knit combination. The success or failure of
the operation rests on an intricate web of personal connections put
together by its leaders. They must develop opium or hashish sources in
Afghanistan, procure "mules" to move the drugs to Iran or to Europe
and garner the necessary wholesale or retail outlets in the country of
distribution. When these high level organizers are removed, the rest of
the syndicate is thrown into disarray until someone else appears who is
capable of restructuring the organization. That such large syndicates
operate in Iran is apparent, but few of their leaders have been
convicted. 40 1 Instead of seeking out these individuals, the police and
gendarmes have concentrated on seizing drugs. The inevitable pressure
to show results may account for this. The indictment of an important
drug financier involves a long, tedious process and much manpower.
The results of the investigation may not appear for months, if not
years. A large opium seizure, on the other hand, leads to immediate
press coverage and a tangible demonstration of police effectiveness.
Since law enforcement could not prevent smuggling, drugs were
relatively plentiful, and an addict felt little pressure or need to seek
rehabilitation. In addition, for those addicts who did seek rehabilita-
tion, there were not sufficient treatment facilities-except perhaps in a
handful of the larger cities. For years the rehabilitation effort floun-
dered because of poor planning and a lack of interest and experi-
ence. 40 2 Rehabilitation centers were planned but never finished. Those
that were finally completed stood empty for lack of staff.403 When the
newly created Ministry of Social Welfare surveyed the rehabilitation
effort in late 1974, it decided that a crash program was needed to
equip even basic facilities. Without at least minimal facilities, rehabili-
400. For a discussion of the terrain of the Iranian-Afghan border see L. Dupree, Afghanis-
tan 26-31 (1973); W. B. Fisher, Physical Geography, in IThe Cambridge History of Iran 62-69,
73-81 (NV. B. Fisher ed. 1968). The famous "wind of 120 days" stirs up violent sandstorms
from Herat in the north to Baluchistan in the south, along almost the entire length of the
Iranian-Afghan border. See L Dupree, Afghanistan 28 (1973).
401. See notes 364-65 supra and accompanying text.
402. See notes 309-10 supra and accompanying text.
403. Cf. J. Upton, The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation 24 (Harv. Middle Eastern
Monograph Ser. 8, 1960).
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tation could not be considered a viable alternative for the street addict.
If law enforcement measures did prove effective, the addict would
have no place to go but to jail.
For those who were sick or over sixty years of age, the registered
addict program did offer another alternative. But like the rehabilita-
tion program, the success of this endeavor ultimately depended on the
police. Unless the police could make it difficult for an addict to support
his habit, there would be no reason for him to join the program and
pay the government 17.5 rials (approximately twenty-five cents) per
gram of opium. In this the police were moderately successful since
approximately 170,000 addicts did register in the program. Lax en-
forcement of the eligibility requirements, however, resulted in a pro-
gram composed of roughly fifty percent of addicts under sixty, some of
them admitted for relatively minor physical ailments. As the program
expanded in size, the amount of legal opium diverted into illegal
channels increased.4 04 A flourishing black market trade in government
opium and sukhteh came into being, causing the police additional
enforcement headaches.
Although these operational problems are serious, they do not fully
account for the failure of the government's drug strategy. There are
two other basic reasons. First, there is no meaningful coordination
among government agencies responsible for drug control; and second,
the government itself seems incapable of supporting a sustained com-
mitment to its own programs and policies.
The responsibility for narcotics enforcement in Iran is divided
among the Ministry of Health (maintenance program), the Ministry of
Social Welfare (rehabilitation), the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural
Affairs (opium cultivation and production), the Ministry of Justice
(courts), the National Police (urban law enforcement), the Gendar-
merie (rural and border law enforcement), the Customs Administration
(limited border law enforcement) and the Army (military courts). This
decentralization of responsibility could be tolerated if there were close
interagency coordination and cooperation. Unfortunately, the neces-
sary coordination and cooperation do not exist. Institutional and
personal jealousies seem to have developed between the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare. 405 The National Police and
the Gendarmerie do not cooperate on drug arrests, and there seems to
be little sharing of intelligence, personnel or equipment.40 6 The mili-
tary tribunals have little contact with the National Police and the
404. See notes 268-69 supra and accompanying text.
405. Field Study, supra note 19.
406. Id.
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Gendarmerie. The courts and prosecutors do not deal with the Minis-
try of Social Welfare or the police. Totally apart from lack of coopera-
tion, there is often ignorance on the part of one agency concerning the
activities of another. The law enforcement agencies seem the most
secretive. An official of one ministry went so far as to ask if he could
accompany the author on a visit to the National Police so he could
learn what they were doing in the drug field. 407
The ministerial committee established in 1974 was supposed to
rectify this situation by providing a forum for the coordination that is
essential if Iran's drug policies are to be the orchestrated response that
was envisioned. Unfortunately, the committee has not been able to
coordinate itself into a functioning entity. The inevitable question is
why is coordination so unattainable? The answer may lie in one of the
more basic rules of Iranian political life which, for the purposes of
discussion, might be termed Rule I.
During the twentieth century, the Shah and his predecessors have
been assaulted by domestic and foreign threats. To survive, the
monarchy has found it necessary to maintain the goodwill of the
military and to prevent opposition groups from organizing. In further-
ance of these related goals, the Shah, in recent years has pampered the
military with sophisticated weaponry and lavish expenditures. 40 8 Si-
multaneously, however, the Shah has attempted to keep separate the
various branches of the military and to fragment other potentially
powerful groups. 40 9 Hence coordination and cooperation between
military branches and between the National Police and the Gendar-
merie is not fostered because the existence of such cooperation could
lead to the development of close personal relationships between officers
in both branches, which ultimately could become a threat to the Shah's
power. 410 Consequently, despite its adverse effect on drug policy, Rule
I requires the monarchy to limit inter-agency coordination.
If Rule I discourages the needed coordination, Rule II inhibits
government commitment to its own drug policies. The essence of Rule
II is that innovation, imagination and productivity progressively di-
minish as one moves away from the center of power. As a result, all
governmental policies tend to die when not continually supervised by
someone with authority. Perhaps this rule, like Rule I, is an inevitable
407. Id.
408. On the size of the Iranian military budget see Kennedy, The Persian Gulf: Arms Race
or Arms Control, 54 Foreign Aff. 14, 25 (1975).
409. Power, supra note 177, at 290.
410. But see Kennedy, supra note 408, at 23, who minimizes the risk of a military
take-over in Iran.
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concomitant of monarchical government. In Iran, power is centered in
the Shah and there are only a few trusted aides to whom he has
delegated any of this power. The Shah and these aides, however,
cannot transform their will into functioning policies without the help of
the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the Iranian bureaucracy is not overly
innovative. As one commentator remarked, it is easy for an Iranian
official "to get lost between reality and what a person thinks the
government thinks is true. '411 In view of the circumstances, it is
understandable that an Iranian official would rather do nothing than
risk doing the wrong thing. Thus, policies tend to stagnate in the
bureaucracy unless constantly attended to by the Shah, the Prime
Minister or some other person with the necessary authority. The
stagnation can continue for years until the Shah or one of his ministers
returns his attention to the matter.
Rule II is exemplified by Iran's drug policy. In 1969, the Shah
ordered a change in existing drug policy: rehabilitation efforts were to
be strengthened, limited poppy cultivation was to be permitted and
maximum force was to be used to keep smuggled drugs out of the
country.412 The policy was implemented, but soon the inevitable
bureaucratic stagnation set in. Hospital construction was not com-
pleted; the necessary staff was not trained; equipment earmarked for
anti-smuggling efforts was diverted to other uses. But in 1974, the
Prime Minister reviewed the drug situation. Recognizing that the
Shah's policies were not being carried out fully, he issued directives to
revitalize the original policy blueprint. 413 Law enforcement efforts
were to be increased; a new ministry was to be formed to implement
drug rehabilitation efforts; a drug education program was to be
instituted.4 14 After the Prime Minister's views became known, there
was the inevitable flurry of activity. The Yaftabad drug rehabilitation
center was quickly completed. The training of medical and administra-
tive staff became a top priority item. Stories on the evils of drug abuse
appeared in the mass media. But by 1975-just one year later-there
were already signs that the pace of activity was again slackening.
First, there is no evidence that an ongoing drug education program has
been established. Second, although the Ministry of Social Welfare
appears committed to revitalizing the nation's moribund drug rehabili-
tation program, no national director has as yet been appointed to
411. FitzGerald, Giving the Shah Everything He Wants, Harpers, Nov. 1974, at 55, 60.
412. See note 254 supra and accompanying text.
413. For mention of the Prime Minister's interest in this 1974 drug strategy see Teheran J.,
July 15, 1974, at 4, col. 1.
414. See id., July 16, 1974, at 3, col. 7; id., July 15, 1974, at 4, col. 5; note 39 supra.
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oversee planning and coordination. Third, police efforts have not been
measurably strengthened, either with increased manpower or re-
sources. Fourth, few interagency coordination efforts have been ini-
tiated at either the regional or international levels.
The foregoing is undoubtedly the result of Rule Il at work. The
Iranian bureaucracy has not changed; it reacts only to pressure
brought from above and then only for as long as the pressure lasts. In
1975, the attention of the Shah and his ministers was focussed on
diverse matters. In the field of foreign affairs, the politics of oil, as well
as tensions with Iraq, dominated the headlines. Domestic political
considerations led the Shah to abrogate the old two party system 415
and appoint the Prime Minister as the general secretary of a new
"national resurgence" party which was created to take its place.
Organizing the June election monopolized much of the government's
time during the spring and summer.416 Also, there was a continuous
flow of foreign dignitaries to Iran attempting to win contracts from the
government. With so much else to do, it is understandable that drug
policy tended to be forgotten by the central authorities.
Without a sustained commitment, however, Iran will never make
significant inroads into nationwide addiction. No nation has ever fully
solved the problem; perhaps the best that a nation can hope to do is to
contain addiction while slowly decreasing the number of addicts over
a long period of time. At some point, however, a hard core of
addiction will be reached-a core that perhaps can never be fully
cured. In order to reach this irreducible core, however, a nation must
have the fortitude and the patience to persevere with its policies over a
long course of time.
In Iran a parable is told about the effects of opium, hashish and
alcohol.
A drunk, an opium addict and a hashish eater arrived at a city after the gates had been
closed. The drunk was furious and shouted, "Let us burst in the gates at once! I will
do it with my sword!" The opium eater said, "Nay, we will tarry here until sunrise;
then the gate will be opened, and we can enter without discomfort." But the hashish
eater murmured in a feeble voice, "Neither way is good; because we can steal through
the keyhole, as we can make ourselves small." 417
Like the alcoholic, the government of Iran at times becomes furious at
its drug problem and commits itself to forceful solutions. At other
415. See The Economist, Mar. 8, 1975, at 55.
416. The election took place on June 20, 1975. For weeks before the election, high level
officials were campaigning throughout the country. Field Study, supra note 19.
417. Johns, supra note 5, at 26, quoting S.G.W. Benjamin, Persia and the Persians 216
(1887).
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times, in the manner of the hashish eater, the government views the
problem unrealistically and attempts unworkable solutions. But like
the opium eater, the most consistent response has been one of compla-
cency. "The gates will open tomorrow." Unfortunately for the country,
the drug problem will still be there tomorrow and will probably be a
much more severe problem for the delay.
